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I. INTRODUCTION

Domestic violence' is a serious problem in the United States that has
devastating consequences for both women and men and their families and
friends. 2 In 2001, there were 691,710 nonfatal incidents of domestic violence
perpetrated by the victim's current or former husband/wife or boyfriend/girlfriend.3 Domestic violence can also have deadly results. In 2000,

Domestic violence is statutorily defined in West Virginia as follows:
"Domestic violence" or "abuse" means the occurrence of one or more of the
following acts between family or household members . . . :
(1) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing
physical harm to another with or without dangerous or deadly weapons;
(2) Placing another in reasonable apprehension of physical harm;
(3) Creating fear of physical harm by harassment, psychological abuse or
threatening acts;
(4) Committing either sexual assault or sexual abuse . . . ; and
(5) Holding, confining, detaining or abducting another person against that person's will.
W. VA. CODE § 48-27-202 (2008). See NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACTS 1, http://www.ncadv.org/files/domesticviolencefacts.pdf (last visited
Feb. 22, 2008) (Domestic violence is defined as "the willful intimidation, assault, battery, sexual
assault, or other abusive behavior perpetrated by an intimate partner against another."). See also
Jay B. Rosman, The Battered Women Syndrome in Florida: Junk Science or Admissible Evidence?, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 807, 808 (2003).
2
See Rosman, supra note 1, at 807-08.

For a tragic example of how domestic violence impacts both the victim and the victim's family,
see Tara Tuckwiller, "A Living Death": Woman Hopes Her Daughter's Story Will Convince At
Least One Person To Leave An Abuser Before It's Too Late, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, Oct. 21,
2007, at P1 A. In the article, a domestic violence victim's mother describes the abuse her daughter, Sonya Bailey, suffered at the hands of her daughter's husband, which ultimately resulted in
severe permanent brain damage. Id. Sonya's husband, thirteen years ago, bashed in Sonya's
skull, stuffed her into the trunk of her car, drove around West Virginia and two other states for
five days, all while Sonya "slowly bled and suffocated." Id. Sonya, who now resides in a nursing
home, is confined to a wheel chair. Id. As described in the article, "[Her] face is frozen in a
smile. Her eyes are vacant.... She can't move. She can't speak. Her hands clench into permanent fists so hard the knucklebones look like they'll pop through the skin. Every four hours,
somebody feeds her though a tube." Id. Her husband was convicted of both battery (under the
Violence Against Women Act) and kidnapping and is serving a life sentence in a federal prison.
Id. Sonya's mother, who visits her "motionless" daughter every day at the nursing home, "hopes
[Sonya's] story will convince at least one person to leave an abuser before it's too late." Id. After
describing the affects of domestic violence on Sonya's life, her mother concluded by stating, "If
you're in that kind of situation, please get out. Just come to Riverside [Nursing Home] and let me
show you Sonya." Id.
3

CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,

INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993-2001 1 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/

pub/pdf/ipv01 .pdf.
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1,247 women and 440 men were killed by their intimate partner.4 As a whole,
however, women are subjected to domestic violence much more frequently than
men. In 1999, women accounted for 1,218, or seventy-four percent, of the
1,642 persons murdered by an intimate partner.5 In 2001, women accounted for
eighty-five percent of domestic violence victims. 6 Shockingly, statistics show
that one in every four women will face domestic violence sometime during her
life.7 This frequency of domestic violence across the country is not without its
financial costs. Such violence exceeds $5.8 billion annually, which includes
$4.1 billion in direct health-care expenses, $900 million in lifetime earnings,
and $900 million in productivity loss.
West Virginia is not excluded from the national epidemic of domestic
violence. In 2005, over 12,803 domestic violence offenses occurred in West
Virginia; thirty-four of those incidents resulted in death.9 Domestic violence
homicides should be a real concern for West Virginians, as two domestic violence homicides occur, on average, every month in the Mountain State.' 0 Statistics show that this average of two-per-month has remained constant since the
late 1970s."
Given the serious and continuing nature of domestic abuse, existing
public education and assistance programs must be expanded to address these
problems before the violence occurs. What happens, however, when public
education and assistance programs do not reach far enough to adequately address such violence? What happens when women who are physically and verbally abused are unable to reach out for assistance because of threats of violence
and death if they do? The statutory and common law in West Virginia does not
adequately address this dilemma. Women who fight back and attempt to free
themselves of their abusive captors are forced to defend their actions on traditional self-defense grounds or even resort to psychological impairment defenses,
4

Id.

5

CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,

INTIMATE

PARTNER VIOLENCE

AND AGE OF VICTIM,

1993-1999 2 (2001), available at

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipva99.pdf.
6

CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,

INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE,

1993-2001 1 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/

pub/pdf/ipv01 .pdf.
7

NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC

VIOLENCE,

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

FACTS

1,

http://www.ncadv.org/files/domesticviolencefacts.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
Id. (citing CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR INJURY
8
PREVENTION AND CONTROL, COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE

UNITED STATES 8 (2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipvcosts/lPVBookFinal-Feb 18.pdf).
9

NATIONAL COALmON AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACTS: WEST

VIRGINIA, http://www.ncadv.org/files/westvirginia.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).

10

West Virginia Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Statistics, http://www.wvcadv.org/
statistics.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
11 Id.
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such as insanity. As this Note will explain, West Virginia's traditional defense
of self-defense is discriminatory toward women in domestic abuse situations
and deprives them of the right to a fair trial. As such, West Virginia needs to
adopt a new defense, entitled "Battered Women Defense," which is similar to,
but entirely separate from, the traditional defense of self-defense. This Battered
Women Defense should be a narrowly tailored version of self-defense for
women in domestic violence situations. 12 As such, the Battered Women Defense should be codified by the West Virginia Legislature and should be recognized by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals as a legitimate, separate
defense available to battered women who protect themselves against their abusers.
In arguing for the adoption of the Battered Women Defense, this Note
will first, in Part H, examine the defense of self-defense and accompanying law.
Part IM.A. of this Note will then examine the Battered Women Syndrome
("BWS") and the underlying cycle of abuse. Next, Part MI.B. will examine each
of the few West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals cases involving a battered
woman who claimed self-defense for her actions against her abuser and/or attempted to utilize evidence of the BWS in her defense. Part IV will argue for
the adoption of the Battered Women Defense in West Virginia. This Part will
argue that such an adoption is essential in West Virginia self-defense cases involving battered women. It will also address anticipated arguments that a Battered Women Defense condones or encourages homicide in domestic violence
cases. This Part concludes with a close examination of a hypothetical situation
involving a battered woman who kills her sleeping husband. It discusses the
application of West Virginia's current law on self-defense to the facts of the
hypothetical while citing to specific West Virginia cases that have either held or
discussed each of the specific points at issue. The purpose of the hypothetical
and resulting "trial" and "appeal" is to prove that the current law on self-defense
in West Virginia is unfair, overly punitive, and discriminatory when applied to
cases involving battered women who strike back against their abuser.
Lastly, this Note will examine State v. Norman, the well-known North
Carolina battered woman case. This examination will draw a parallel between
North Carolina and West Virginia in an attempt to show that, because both
states have a similar law on self-defense, a completely unacceptable judicial
decision such as State v. Norman is inevitable in West Virginia unless West
Virginia's self-defense laws are immediately changed to specifically address the
sensitive circumstances surrounding self-defense cases involving battered
women.
12 As previously stated, domestic violence against. women is greatly more prevalent than
against men. The need for such a defense, therefore, is greater for abused and battered women
than for men. Because of this prevalence, this author chooses to restrict the analysis of the need
for a new defense to cases involving battered and abused women. A gender-neutral defense could
be entitled "Battered Person Defense," which would account for both men and women who strike
back in domestic violence situations.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss3/8
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II. THE DEFENSE OF SELF-DEFENSE

The defense of self-defense derives from the common law and is used as
a justification by a non-aggressor in using force upon another if the nonaggressor reasonably believes that such force is "necessary to protect himself
from imminent use of unlawful force by the other person."' 13 The defense of
self-defense is considered a justification defense and contains the following
three elements: (1) the force must be "necessary," requiring an "imminent"
threat; (2) the force must be "proportionate" to the threat; and (3) the nonaggressor must have a "reasonable belief' in the use of force.' 4 Stated another
way, for purposes of self-defense involving an intentional killing, such killing
will be justified when the following four requirements are met:
1. An actor can only defend herself against what she reasonably
believes is unlawful force.
2. The amount offorce must be proportionateto the threatened
force. Deadly force may not be used unless the actor reasonably believes that she is protecting herself against infliction of
death or serious bodily harm.
3. The actor must reasonably believe that it is necessary to use
force to prevent the threatened harm.
4. The actor must reasonably believe
that the adversary's threat5
ened use of force is imminent.'
The common law defense of self-defense in West Virginia is similarly
written. The settled law on self-defense in West Virginia is as follows:
[A] defendant who is not the aggressor and has reasonable
grounds to believe, and actually does believe, that he is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm from which he
could save himself only by using deadly force against his assailant has
the right to employ deadly force in order to defend
6
himself.'
13 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 237 (4th ed. 2006). See Robert F.
Schopp, Barbara J.Sturgis & Megan Sullivan, Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and
the DistinctionBetween Justificationand Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 45, 49-50 (1994).
14 DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 238; Schopp et al., supra note 13, at 49-50.
15 Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: CorrectingA HistoricalAccident on Behalf
of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 11, 28-29 (1986).
16 State v. Headley, 558 S.E.2d 324, 328 (W. Va. 2001) (citing State v. W.J.B., 276 S.E.2d
550, 553 (W. Va. 1981)).
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Among the elements listed above, the "imminency" of the danger is crucial to a
claim of self-defense. 17 The defendant has the burden of showing that the danger was in fact imminent. 18 Concerning the allowable time frame from the perceived danger to the alleged act of self-defense, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals maintains, "[n]o apprehension of danger previously entertained will justify the commission of the homicide; it must be an apprehension
existing at the time the defendant fired the fatal shot."' 9
Unfortunately, these traditional requirements do not adequately address
the circumstances surrounding why a battered woman strikes back against her
abuser. The traditional notion of self-defense and its corresponding requirements were originally developed for situations involving a man who kills another man of comparative size and strength during a threatened attack in order to
protect himself or his family. 20 The defender against the threatened harm in
these circumstances typically had only the single encounter with his aggressor.2'
The requirements of self-defense in these situations sufficiently protect the male
defender from legal responsibility for his actions, but the same cannot be said
for a battered woman who kills her abuser.

In a recent decision, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals again set forth the elements of the traditional defense of self-defense as follows:
When one without fault himself is attacked by another in such a manner or
under such circumstances as to furnish reasonable grounds for apprehending a
design to take away his life, or to do him some great bodily harm, and there is
reasonable grounds for believing the danger imminent, that such design will
be accomplished, and the person assaulted has reasonable ground to believe,
and does believe, such danger is imminent, he may act upon such appearances
and without retreating, kill his assailant, if he has reasonable grounds to believe, and does believe, that such killing is necessary in order to avoid the apparent danger; and the killing under such circumstances is excusable, although
it may afterwards turn out, that the appearances were false, and that there was
in fact neither design to do him some serious injury nor danger, that it would
be done. But of all this the jury must judge from all the evidence and circumstances of the case.
Syl. Pt. 6, State v. Whittaker, 650 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va. 2007) (citing Syl. Pt. 7, State v. Cain, 20 W.
Va. 679 (1882)). For an examination of the facts and court reasoning of the Whittaker case, see
infra notes 166-199 and accompanying text.
17
Whittaker, 650 S.E.2d at 225.
18
Id. at Syl. Pt. 7 (citing Syl. Pt. 6, State v. McMillion, 138 S.E. 732 (W. Va. 1927)). Once
the defendant puts forth "sufficient evidence to create a reasonable doubt that the killing resulted
from the defendant acting in self-defense," the burden then shifts to the prosecution to "prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense." Whittaker, 650 S.E.2d
at 226 (citing Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Kirtley, 252 S.E.2d 374 (1978)).
19
Syl. Pt. 7, Whittaker, 650 S.E.2d at 216 (citing Syl. Pt. 6, McMillion, 138 S.E. at 732).
20
Rosen, supra note 15, at 34.
21

Id.
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The context surrounding the battered woman and her abuser is usually
vastly different. The male abuser, whom the battered woman protects herself
against, is most often physically larger and stronger than she, and the relationship between the two involves an ongoing or past relationship, far from a single
occurrence. 22 Unlike the male for whom the defense of self-defense originated,
the abused woman's fear and actions will be influenced by her knowledge of her
abuser's character and propensity for violence. 23 As a result, these self-defense
"[r]ules requiring like force, imminency, consideration of only the circumstances immediately surrounding the killing, and use of an objective reasonable
man standard necessarily defeat the woman's claim., 24 Those battered women
who must use this male-oriented theory do so at a great risk of conviction.
In using the defense of self-defense, a battered woman will attempt to
put forth evidence as to why her action of killing her abusive partner was reasonable. 25 This evidence is most often in the form of expert testimony concerning the psychological state of the abused woman. 26 The desired uses of such
expert testimony in self-defense cases involving battered women defendants are
as follows:
Theoretically, the woman's defensive action will be proved
necessary and proportionate by showing how the defendant
could perceive a threat of imminent danger in verbal threats
alone, in a nondeadly [sic] attack from an unarmed spouse, or
from a sleeping man. The testimony explains why the woman
stayed with her spouse despite the abusive relationship and
why, on the occasion in question, she may not have run away or
sought assistance from friends, relatives, or the police despite
an apparent opportunity to do so. Finally, the testimony explains why the woman cannot be faulted for becoming involved
in an abusive relationship. Rather, she is a victim of her social
reality, responding to circumstances in accordance with the values of femininity and lifelong marriage to which she was acculturated.
This psychological condition in battered women has generally become
known as the "Battered Women Syndrome. 2 8

22

Id.

2

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id. at 41.

26

Id. at 40 n.167.

27

Id. at41.
DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 258; see Rosman, supra note 1, at 809-10.

28
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I. THE BATIERED WOMEN SYNDROME

A.

Discussion of the Battered Women Syndrome

The Battered Women Syndrome ("BWS"), also called the Battered
Woman Syndrome, the Battered Wife Syndrome, or the Battered Spouse Syndrome, results from a cycle of physical abuse against a woman by her partner in
a domestic relationship. 29 This cycle of abuse was developed and articulated by
Dr. Lenore Walker.30 Each cycle of abuse has three phases.31 Phase one is
called the "tension building" phase 32 and consists of small episodes of abuse,
such as minor incidents of battery and verbal abuse.33 In addition, during this
first phase, the victim of the domestic abuse "may plan to escape or [has] tried
to escape in the past and failed." 34 Phase two involves an "acute battering incident," also called the "major violence phase, 35 where the woman is severely
beaten. 36 The woman's behavior during this second phase is described as follows:
During [the major violence phase] the woman is more likely to
concentrate on survival than on escape. Her behavior at this
time is characterized by "learned helplessness." The woman
will feel that her batterer is omnipotent and that no one can help
Douglas A. Orr, Weiand v. State, and the Battered Spouse Syndrome: The Toothless Tigress
Can Now Roar, 2 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 125, 128 (2000); see Schopp et al., supra note 13, at 50-52.
One definition of the Battered Women Syndrome is stated as follows: "a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her
to do something he wants her to do without any concern for her rights." Rosman, supra note 1, at
809. Battered Women Syndrome also has the following four general characteristics:
(1) The woman believes that the violence was her fault, (2) [tlhe woman has
an inability to place the responsibility for the violence elsewhere, (3) [t]he
woman fears for her life and/or her children's lives, and (4) [tlhe woman has
an irrational belief that the abuser is omnipresent and omniscient.
29

Id. at 810.
30
See Rosman, supra note 1, at 809; Schopp et al., supra note 13, at 50, 53-59; Kerry A. Shad,
State v. Norman: Self-Defense Unavailable to Battered Women Who Kill Passive Abusers, 68
N.C.L. REV. 1159, 1166 (1990).
31 Rosen, supra note 15, at 40 n.165 (citing Walker, Thyfault & Browne, Beyond the Juror's
Ken: Battered Women, 7 VT. L. REV. 1, 6 (1982)); see Rosman, supra note 1, at 809; Schopp et
al., supra note 13, at 50-52.
32
Rosen, supra note 15, at 40 n.165 (citing Walker, Thyfault & Browne, Beyond the Juror's
Ken: Battered Women, 7 VT. L. REv. 1, 6 (1982)); Rosman, supra note 1, at 809; Schopp et al.,
supra note 13, at 50-51.
33

Orr,supra note 29, at 128.

34
35

Rosen, supra note 15, at 40 n. 165.
Id.; Rosman, supra note 1, at 809; Schopp et al., supra note 13, at 50-51.
Orr, supra note 29, at 128.

36
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her. She will focus her emotional energy on developing coping
responses rather than escape responses.37
The final phase, occurring after the "acute battering incident," is called
the "honeymoon" phase and is characterized by calmness, where the abuser's
behavior is "kind, loving, and contrite. ,038 Unfortunately, this change in behavior reinforces the woman's desire that her partner will change his abusive
ways.39 In addition, "[d]ue to learned helplessness and her desire to make the
relationship work, the victim is likely to succumb to her tormentor's promises of
reform .... "0 Thereafter, however, the cycle will start over and phase one will
begin again.4 ' This cycle also changes for the worse over time because "the
tension building periods become longer and more
intense while the periods of
42
contrition become shorter and less compelling.
This cycle of abuse over time has dramatic psychological effects on the
abused woman because she develops a constant fear of her tormentor and believes that she is powerless to make her situation better.4 3 The majority of
women in this situation are unable to leave their batterer for a number of reasons, such as lack of financial resources, lack of any alternative place to go "due
to the reluctance of friends, family, and police to get involved," or out of fear
that the abuser could or has already threatened to kill her if she attempts to
leave." Thus, "[k]illing her abuser becomes her only means of escape" from
her fearful, perpetually abusive environment.4 5
Many battered women feel that the particular episode culminating in the
killing of the batterer was more severe or life-threatening than previous battering episodes. 46 Over the course of the battering cycle, the abused woman develops a sense as to oncoming violence or certain environmental factors that trigger
violent episodes.4 7 One article summarized this notion as follows:
37 Rosen, supra note 15, at 40 n.165 (citing Walker, Thyfault & Browne, Beyond the Juror's
Ken: Battered Women, 7 VT. L. REv. 1, 6, 9 (1982)) (citations omitted).
38 Id.; Rosman, supra note 1, at 809; Schopp et al., supra note 13, at 50-51.
39 Orr,supra note 29, at 128; Rosman, supra note 1, at 809.
40
Rosen, supra note 15, at 40 n. 165; Rosman, supra note 1, at 809; Schopp et al., supra note
13, at 51, 87-89.
41 Orr,supra note 29, at 128; Schopp et al.,
supra note 13, at 51.
42
Rosen, supra note 15, at 40 n.165 (citing Walker, Thyfault & Browne, Beyond the Juror's
Ken: Battered Women, 7 VT. L. REv. 1, 9 (1982)).
43
Orr,supra note 29, at 128; Schopp et al., supra note 13, at 51, 88-89.
44 Rosen, supra note 15, at 41 n.169; see Rosman, supra note 1, at 809-10; Schopp et al., supra note 13, at 51-52, 88.
45 Orr, supra note 29, at 128; see also Schopp et al., supra note 13, at 87-88.
46
Rosen, supra note 15, at 38 n.161 (citing Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trialfor
Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623,634-35 (1980)).
47

Id.
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Studies suggest that battered women have learned to be attentive to signs of escalating violence and to modify their behavior
in response to these danger signals in order to pacify violent
husbands. Subtle motions or threats that might not signify danger to an outsider or to the trier of fact [jury] acquire added
meaning for a battered woman whose survival depends on an
intimate knowledge of her assailant.4a
Lastly, the woman's ultimate decision to kill her abuser develops in one
of three situations: confrontational, non-confrontational, and third party intervention. 49 The first situation, confrontation, arises when the battered woman
kills her abusive partner during an incident of abuse. 50 This situation encompasses the majority of domestic violence prosecutions against the abused
spouse. 51 The second situation, non-confrontation, arises when the battered
woman kills her abusive partner when an incident of abuse is not immediately
occurring, sometimes when the abuser is asleep.52 The third situation, third
party intervention, arises when the battered woman hires or "importunes" a third
party to kill the abusive partner for her.53 The following section will focus on
cases involving the first two situations, confrontational and non-confrontational,
and how the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has addressed the use of
the Battered Women Syndrome in those cases.
B.

Treatment of the Battered Women Syndrome in West Virginia Cases
Alleging Self-Defense - A Critique

West Virginia recognizes the BWS, but the case law is sparse. There
may be various reasons for this, such as lack of understanding by defense counsel as to its proper use, lack of success in defense cases using the BWS, belief
among trial judges that the BWS does not really exist, or perhaps because few
cases are appealed that attempt to make use of the BWS. For example, the record of a 1996 West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals case stated that the
Raleigh County Circuit Court judge commented during the pre-trial proceedings
that "he did not 'really think there is such a thing' as battered women's syndrome." 4 In the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals cases where the
BWS was discussed, the court has offered no clear guidelines for how an abused

48

Id.

49

DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 258-59.
Id.; see Schopp et al., supra note 13, at 74.

50

51
52

53
54

DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 259.
Id.; see Schopp et al., supra note 13, at 73-74.
DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 259.
State v. Wyatt, 482 S.E.2d 147, 157 (W. Va. 1996).
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woman can properly use the BWS as part of her claim for self-defense and has
not adopted the BWS as a separate defense.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals first mentioned the possibility of the use of the BWS in State v. Dozier5 and State v. Duell.56 The court
in Dozier addressed a self-defense claim by a woman who had a history of
abuse.57 In reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County and
awarding the defendant a new trial, the court made reference to the possible use
of the BWS when it reasoned as follows:
[W]e know the defense would be entitled, in the event of a retrial, to elicit testimony about the prior physical beatings she received in order that the jury may fully evaluate and consider the
defendant's mental state at the time of the commission of the
offense.58
In Duell, the court addressed an insanity defense claim where a psychologist
testified that the defendant, a battered woman, was "out of touch with reality. 59
In its later decisions involving self-defense claims by battered women, the court,
in relying on the foundations set by Dozier and Duell, expanded its analysis of
the BWS. Each of these decisions is set forth below and is analyzed in chronological order to demonstrate how the court has addressed, over time, the possible uses and limitations of the BWS by battered women defendants.
1.

State v. Steele

In 1987, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals specifically confronted the issue of the BWS in State v. Steele.6° The court stated that its past
decisions in both Dozier and Duell "suggest that, in an appropriate case, evidence regarding [Battered Women S]yndrome may be introduced.",6 1 In this and
later cases, however, the court has been far from clear as to what constitutes an
"appropriate case" and how the use of the BWS actually advances the case for
the abused woman. In Steele, the defendant, an abused ex-wife, sought to defend her killing of her ex-husband on the underlying defense of self-defense
based on the BWS.62 On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court "improperly limited expert testimony regarding the 'battered woman's syndrome'
55
56
57

State v. Dozier, 255 S.E.2d 552, 555 (W. Va. 1979).
State v. Duell, 332 S.E.2d 246 (W. Va. 1985).
Dozier, 255 S.E.2d at 555.

58

Id.

59

State v. Steele, 359 S.E.2d 558, 563 (W. Va. 1987) (citing Duell, 332 S.E.2d at 246).
Steele, 359 S.E.2d at 558.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 560.

60
61
62
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and the history
of threats and violent behavior directed toward the defendant by
'6
the victim. 1
The record indicated that the woman was subjected to intimidation and
threats of violence by her then husband 64 for a five-year period.65 Specifically,
when the defendant confronted her husband about an extramarital affair he was
having, the husband allegedly vandalized her trailer while she was away. 66 In
addition, after the defendant brought an action for divorce, the husband threatened to burn her trailer if she attempted to carry through with the divorce. 67 The
defendant was granted a divorce and, one month later, a fire destroyed her
trailer.68 She then moved into a farmhouse, which was destroyed by fire soon
afterwards. 69 The defendant later remarried, but her new husband was shot by
someone through the window of the couple's home.7 °
The defendant testified at trial that her abusive ex-husband admitted to
shooting her new husband and promised he would "finish the job.",7 1 Two years
later, the couple's house was again destroyed by fire. 72 The defendant testified
that thereafter, her ex-husband's threats increased. 73 The testimony of the defendant indicates that she agreed to travel with her ex-husband out of fear for
herself and her family if she turned down his request.7 4 When the defendant
changed her mind and told her ex-husband that she did not want to go, he
grabbed her arm, forced her into his car, and drove her in a direction different
from the route known for the planned trip.75 During this time, he spoke to her
with sexual innuendos, "told her he had a 'surprise' for her," stopped the car on
a remote road, and instructed her to get into the back seat, which she did.76 As
the ex-husband turned around in the car, she shot him with a handgun she was
carrying.7 7 She stated that she shot him because "[she] was scared of what he

63

Id.

64

The defendant and the deceased were divorced before the homicide occurred. Id. at 561.

65

Id. at 560.

66

Id.
Id.

67

68
69

Id.
Id.

70

Id. at 561.

71

Id.
Id.

72

73
74
75
76

77

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The defendant then ignited the car and fled on

foot.

The defendant, though testifying to the above allegations at trial, sought
to introduce the testimony of an expert, a psychologist, who examined the defendant three months after she shot her ex-husband. 80 The psychologist testified
at trial that the defendant had a "tremendous amount of residual fear" toward her
ex-husband. 81 The trial court examination of the expert's testimony went as
follows:
When asked whether such fears were justified, [the expert] replied they were. He described [the defendant and the decedent's] relationship as having been characterized by a long-term
pattern of intimidation, and noted that the defendant had "very,
very little ability" to resolve her situation. He concluded by observing that the defendant's situation was an exaggeration of the
common scenario in which one is "pushed to the wall" and acts
violently out of character. The trial court sustained an objection
to this last remark as touching upon matters for the jury's de82
termination.
When attempting to testify as to the individual incidents of violence
83
Ultiagainst the defendant, however, the expert was not permitted to do so.
mately, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals determined that the trial
court did not err because, not only was the defendant allowed to testify as to her
own allegations of abusive events, but the expert, along with an additional expert, was allowed to testify as to their opinions of the "defendant's mental condition resulting from the relationship, her belief that the [decedent] was dangerous, and her inability to extricate herself from the situation. 84 Specifically concerning the use of expert testimony on the issue of the BWS, the court stated,
"Expert testimony can be utilized to explain the psychological basis for the battered woman's syndrome and to offer an opinion that the defendant meets the
requisite profile of the syndrome. 85 The defendant was also given her prof-

78

Id.

79

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

80
81
82
83
94

Id. at 565.
Id.

Id. at 564. This ruling on the use of expert testimony on the Battered Women Syndrome
was elevated to a syllabus point for the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. See Syl. Pt. 5,
State v. Steele, 359 S.E.2d 558 (W. Va. 1987).
85
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fered instructions on self-defense. 86 The court affirmed the trial court's judgment of first degree murder and third degree arson against the defendant.87
The Steele case represents the inadequacy of the defense of self-defense
in domestic violence cases and the inability of the BWS testimony to bolster that
defense. The court first based its analysis on the traditional notion of selfdefense.88 Then, the court examined the relevance of the defendant's use of
evidence of prior violent acts by the deceased.8 9 The court maintained that this
evidence could be used by a defendant to show "the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that the deceased intended to inflict serious bodily injury or
death and, as a consequence, the defendant was justified in the killing." 90 When
the court approached the issue of the BWS in homicide cases, however, the
court's analysis was highly inconsistent. Specifically, the court conceded that
the killing in such cases is often "not triggered by an act of violence toward the
defendant that would meet the traditional standard of threatening serious bodily
injury or death." 9 1 The court also noted that battered women "can lose the capability to objectively determine the degree of danger., 92 Despite its recognition that battered women can lose their objective capacity, the court nonetheless
held that those battered women will still be held to an objective reasonableness
standard. 93 As support for this inconsistent result, the court cited a 1984 New

86

Id. at 565.

87

Id. at 566.

88

Id. at 564. The language of the traditional defense of self-defense on which the court relied

is as follows:
Where, in a trial for murder, there is competent evidence tending to show that
the accused believed, and had reasonable grounds to believe, that he was in
danger of losing his life or suffering great bodily harm at the hands of several
assailants acting together, he may defend against any or all of said assailants,
and it is reversible error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury to that
effect.
Id.
89
Id.
90 Id. The full text of the court's reasoning on the relevance of evidence of prior violent acts is
as follows:
The reason evidence of prior acts of violence toward a defendant by the deceased is relevant is because it relates to the reasonableness of the defendant's
belief that the deceased intended to inflict serious bodily injury or death and,
as a consequence, the defendant was justified in the killing.
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. The court reasoned as follows: "[I]t
is shown by competent psychological studies that
women who have suffered severe and prolonged physical abuse can lose the capability to objectively determine the degree of danger." Id.
93

Id.
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Jersey decision, which summarized the relevance of psychological testimony in
cases involving the BWS. 94 This decision is cited as follows:
We do not mean that the expert's testimony could be used to
show that it was understandable that a battered woman might
believe that her life was in danger when indeed it was not and
when a reasonable person would not have so believed ....Expert testimony in that direction would be relevant solely to the
honesty of the defendant's belief, not its objective reasonableness. Rather, our conclusion is that the expert's testimony, if
accepted by the jury, would have aided it in determining
whether, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would
have believed there was imminent danger to her life.95
The above reasoning by both the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and the New Jersey Supreme Court shows bias against victims of domestic
violence who act against their abusers. Specifically, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals recognized a decline of the objective reasoning in women who
have endured long-term abusive relationships by "los[ing] the capability to objectively determine the degree of danger."96 Yet, the court cites the New Jersey
Supreme Court as stating the objective, reasonable person standard will be used
anyway to determine the abused woman's belief of imminent danger. 97 Given
that an objective reasonableness standard was used in this case, the case's outcome makes clear that a strict, objective reasonableness standard is inadequate
and biased when used in battered women cases. The outcome also indicates a
possible bias or lack of understanding by the jury of the circumstances surrounding battered women when instructed by the trial judge to apply an objective reasonableness standard to the abused woman's actions.
Even putting aside the allegations of threats and violence covering a
five-year period by the decedent, the incidents leading up to the shooting indicate that the actions of the defendant could be justified on traditional confrontational self-defense grounds alone. As stated above, the ex-husband forced the
defendant into his car, spoke to her using sexual innuendos, told her he had a
"surprise" for her, stopped the car on a remote road, and told her to get into the
back seat. 98 Just on these facts alone, a reasonable person could easily believe
that she was acting in self-defense from a "reasonable belief' that she was in
imminent danger of an attack, such as the presumed rape in this instance. 99 In
94
95
96

97
98

99

Id. (citing State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 377 (N.J. 1984)).
Id. (citing Kelly, 478 A.2d at 377).
Steele, 359 S.E.2d at 564.
Id. (citing Kelly, 478 A.2d at 377).
Steele, 359 S.E.2d at 561.
See generally DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 262.
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addition, a reasonable person should also see the necessity of the action given
the vulnerability of the abused woman in the back seat of her ex-husband's
car. l°° Lastly, a reasonable person should also see that the proportion of force
was justified to repel the harm threatened. 01 Without the use of a handgun to
repel an impending rape in the backseat of a car on a remote road, a woman
would have little resources for defense against her male attacker.
A different outcome should have resulted in this case even without factoring in the defendant's knowledge of the fear she had and the abuse she had
received as a result of her abuser's past actions. It is difficult to believe that any
other instrument besides a firearm would repel advances from her attacker. If
such an alternative non-lethal method was tried first without success, such an
attempt to repel the attack could lead to further violence toward the victim beyond the inevitable rape. It is not reasonable to require a woman in such a situation to either succumb to the attack or to defend herself with useless non-lethal
methods in the backseat of a car. The law in this case forces the abused victim
to make a choice: succumb to the attack and possibly fight back using nonlethal means, inevitably causing further abuse, or use lethal force to repel the
attack and be sentenced to prison for murder. The law here protects the attacker
more so than the victim. Such a result is highly unjust.
2.

State v. McClanahan

In 1994, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals again addressed
the issue of the BWS.1°2 State v. McClanahan involved a semi-confrontational
self-defense case involving a woman who suffered from past abuse.10 3 The defendant was subjected to abuse from her husband while he drank.' °4 The facts
indicate that the defendant and her husband had marital problems, and that the
defendant's husband subjected her to verbal abuse, threatened to kill her, and
beat and struck her on occasion. 0 5 On the occasion in question, the defendant
had an argument with her husband and the husband grabbed her by her shirt. 1°6
100
101

See generally id.
See generally id. While it is argued that the defendant's use of a firearm in the given situa-

tion was reasonable, this author does not contend that the defendant's subsequent act of igniting
the vehicle was reasonable. However, because the subsequent act was not used to repel the exhusband's impending attack and because the act resulted in a separate charge, specifically arson,
this author's discussion of reasonable force is limited to the defendant's use of the firearm in selfdefense that actually resulted in the homicide. In this context, the Battered Women Defense
would only be used as a defense to the homicide charge, i.e., use of the firearm to repel the existing threat. It would not, however, be used as a defense to the subsequent arson charge because the
act of igniting the car with her deceased ex-husband inside occurred after the threat was repelled.
102
State v. McClanahan, 454 S.E.2d 115 (W. Va. 1994).
103
Id.
104
Id. at 117.
105

Id.

106

Id.
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The defendant then retrieved a handgun from her upstairs bedroom, went to the
doorway of the house, and when her husband attempted to reenter the house, she
said, "Get away from me" and shot him once, wounding him. 01 7
The defendant, at her trial for unlawful wounding, presented a licensed
psychologist who testified that the defendant "demonstrated the characteristics
of a person suffering from the battered wife syndrome."'' 0 8 Even though the
"battered spouse" defense was raised at her trial and was submitted to the jury,
the defendant did not raise error on that issue, but instead raised issue with regard to the defense of self-defense."19 This is unfortunate, though not surprising,
because evidence of the BWS, as indicated above, had not been particularly
useful in West Virginia criminal cases involving battered women. As this case
indicates, the traditional claim of self-defense does not seem to provide the
abused woman a fair trial when she acts against her abusive spouse. Specifically, the court analyzed the use of the defense of self-defense in criminal cases
as follows: "[A]n apprehension of harm, to support a claim of self-defense,
must be an apprehension existing at the time of the defendant's attack on the
victim."' 10 Further, "[n]o apprehension of danger previously entertained will
justify the commission of the homicide; it must be an apprehension existing at
the time the defendant fired the fatal shot."''
Thus, under the facts of this case, a "reasonable person" may not have
reacted with such force as did the defendant. However, during the defendant's
trial, the defendant's husband even testified that he had been abusive to the defendant and that, after thinking about the events before the shooting, he believed
that the defendant's act of shooting him was justified." 2 The defendant's husband testified, "I don't think she [the defendant] wants any more beatings and
stuff like that. I think she had a right to do it."'" 3 Yet, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the jury's verdict of guilty."14 This result
poses the following question: Is it possible for a person who has suffered a history of abuse and who is occasionally beaten by her husband to react as an objectively "reasonable person" in any threatening situation involving her abusive
husband?

107

Id.

108

Id.

109

Id. at 117 n.1.

110

Id. at 118.

I"I
112

Id. (quoting Syl. Pt. 6, State v. McMillion, 138 S.E. 732 (W. Va. 1927)).
McClanahan,454 S.E.2d at 117.

113

Id.

114

Id. at 121.
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State v. Smith

Because it appears that confrontational cases by abused women are very
hard to win, even with evidence of past abuse and testimony of such facts by the
abuser, as seen in McClanahan,' 5 it would therefore seem impossible to set
forth a successful claim of self-defense in a non-confrontational situation. State
H6 West Virginia Supreme Court
v. Smith, a 1996 per curiam
of Appeals deci17
sion, suggests this result.'
Smith involved a typical non-confrontational situation: The abuser was
asleep when the abused partner acted.11 8 The unusual aspect of this case, however, is that the defendant merely held the barrel of the rifle while her 16-yearold son" 9 pulled the trigger. 20 The abuser was the defendant's boyfriend and
had lived with the defendant in her mobile home for several years.12 ' The record indicates much testimony of arguments, shouting, threats, and use of profanity, which was mutual between the defendant and her boyfriend. 12 2 The defendant testified that her boyfriend had struck her on previous occasions. 2 3 The
court noted that the defendant did not establish that she was physically injured
or sought medical assistance from her boyfriend's strikes.1 24 The children testified that the morning before the shooting, the boyfriend was angry and struck
the defendant's head against the side of her mobile home. 25 The defendant then
left for her mother's house, but returned that evening. 126 Another argument en27
sued, during which the boyfriend allegedly threatened to kill the defendant.1
115

Id. at 117.

116
A per curiam opinion is not considered legal precedent and anything included in the opinion
not included in the syllabus points should be considered as obiter dicta. State v. Riley, 500 S.E.2d
524, 527 n.1 (W. Va. 1997) (citing Lieving v. Hadley, 423 S.E.2d 600, 604 n.4 (W. Va. 1992)).
However, for purposes of this Note, this case is analyzed to show how the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals ruled on a specific, non-confrontational case involving a woman in an abusive
relationship that acted against her abuser.
17
See State v. Smith, 481 S.E.2d 747 (W. Va. 1996).
118
Id. at 749.
119 Id. The defendant's 16-year-old son was from a previous marriage and he resided in the
mobile home. Id. at 748. The defendant also had two other children from a previous marriage,
but neither of the two resided in the mobile home. Id. In addition, the defendant and her boyfriend, the deceased in this case, had three young children together who did reside in the mobile
home. Id.
120
Id. at 749.
121 Id. at 748.
122 Id. at 749.
123

Id.

124

Id.

125

Id.

126

Id.

127

Id.
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Afterwards, when the boyfriend fell asleep on the couch, the defendant put her
three young children in the car, went back inside the mobile home, and held the
barrel of a rifle while her son pulled the trigger, killing the boyfriend. 28 During
the shooting, the defendant said to her son, "Let's just, you know, it's the only
way we'll be safe." 129 Lastly, during her incarceration for homicide and conspiracy, 30 the defendant wrote various letters to her son, also incarcerated, asking him to take responsibility for the 3shooting so she could be released and gain
custody of her three young children.1 '
At trial, the court refused to admit evidence of the deceased's prior acts
of violence toward her and her children. 32 The court also refused to admit the
testimony of the defendant's expert witness, a psychologist, on the issue of the
defendant's fear of the deceased. 133 The expert did testify in camera, however,
that the defendant did not meet the full criteria of the BWS. 134 The trial court
granted the State's motions in limine to exclude "any evidence of [the deceased's] alleged acts of misconduct or violence toward the appellant or her
children and to exclude any reference by the appellant to the theory of 'battered
woman syndrome.""1 35 The trial court concluded that the evidence before the
court was insufficient to give a jury instruction on self-defense.' 36 On appeal,
the defendant alleged, among other things, that the trial court erred in refusing to
give a jury instruction on self-defense and for refusing to admit evidence of the
deceased's prior acts of violence toward her and her children. 137 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to refuse to
instruct the jury on self-defense because, though the defendant feared the deceased,139the defendant was not in imminent danger138 and did not suffer from
BWS.

128

Id. It is important to note that the rifle misfired when the son first pulled the trigger. Id.

Because the misfire did not awaken the boyfriend, the son reloaded the rifle and, while the defendant again held the barrel, fired the fatal shot. Id.
129

Id.

Id. at 748. The defendant was convicted by jury of second-degree murder and the offense of
conspiracy. Id.
131
Id. at 749-50.
130

132
133

134
135
136
137

138

Id. at 750-51.
Id. at 751.
Id. at 752 n.5.
Id. at 750 (emphasis added).
Id. at 750.
Id. at 750-51.
In reaching its conclusion to exclude evidence of the deceased's alleged prior bad acts, the

court pointed to syllabus point one of the opinion concerning self-defense, which reads:
When in a prosecution for murder the defendant relies upon self-defense to
excuse the homicide and the evidence does not show or tend to show that the
defendant was acting in self-defense when he shot and killed the deceased, the

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2008

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 8

1158

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 110

In support of its decision, the court cited a 1987 Pennsylvania Superior
Court case, Commonwealth v. Grove.14° The facts of that case were similar to
Smith, in that it involved a woman who, with the help of her daughter, shot and
killed her husband while he slept. 14 The court affirmed the defendant's conviction of murder and conspiracy and rejected the defendant's assertion that the
1 42
trial court erred in excluding evidence of her husband's past acts of violence.
The court held that the defendant "offered no evidence whatsoever to establish
that she or any other person was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury on the present occasion when the deadly force was used.' 43 Interestingly, however, the court also noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had
explained the following concerning the plight of battered women: "A woman
whose husband has repeatedly subjected her to physical abuse does not, by
choosing to maintain her family relationship with that husband and their children, consent to or assume the risk of further abuse."' 44 This statement, however thoughtful, did not appear to influence the court's opinion that self-defense
was not present and prior bad acts of her abuser should be withheld.

defendant will not be permitted to prove that the deceased was of dangerous,
violent and quarrelsome character or reputation.
Id. at 751 (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Collins, 180 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1971)). Since the court
determined that the evidence did not indicate the presence of self-defense, the court pointed to
syllabus point two of the opinion concerning the giving of jury instructions, which reads: "Instructions must be based upon the evidence and an instruction which is not supported by evidence
should not be given." Id. at 753 (quoting Syl. Pt. 4, Collins, 180 S.E.2d at 54).
139
Id. at 752.
140 Id. at 751 (citing Commonwealth v. Grove, 526 A.2d 369, 372-73 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)).
141 Id. at 751 (citing Grove, 526 A.2d at 372-73).
142

Id.

143

Id. at 752 (quoting Grove, 526 A.2d at 372-73).

Id. at 751 (quoting Grove, 526 A.2d at 372-73). The full text of the Pennsylvania Superior
Court's analysis of its ultimate conclusion that self-defense was not present reads as follows:
We find that self-defense was not properly at issue because there was no evidence presented to establish that appellant reasonably believed that she or any
other person was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury on the
present occasion when the deadly force was used. In reaching this conclusion
we are mindful of the unique questions and considerations which arise in
cases involving intra-familial, and especially intra-spousal, violence or abuse.
In the context of a claim of self-defense by a battered spouse, our Supreme
Court has explained: "A woman whose husband has repeatedly subjected her
to physical abuse does not, by choosing to maintain her family relationship
with that husband and their children, consent to or assume the risk of further
abuse."
Id. at 751 (quoting Grove, 526 A.2d at 372-73).
144
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State v. Riley

Less than a year after deciding Smith, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals addressed another non-confrontational self-defense claim by a battered woman who killed her abuser in State v. Riley.145 This per curiam146 opinion concerned the alleged error of the trial court, among other alleged errors,
that, because the defendant had a history of abuse by the deceased, she should
1 47
have been allowed to further develop her theory of the BWS as a defense.
The record of the case indicates a history of abuse. 148 Though the defendant
stated that the abuse was "infrequent," she testified that the deceased was
"nasty" and verbally abused her "so bad you would be afraid that he might use
his fist on you.' 149 She also testified to an episode where the deceased threw a
knife into the wall near the defendant's head. 50 The defendant testified that,
shortly before she shot the decedent, the decedent slapped her in the face.' 5 1
Then, when the defendant left the room to lie down, the decedent "entered the
room and repeatedly threw [her] cat across the room."' 5 2 Thereafter, the abuser
called the emergency services and informed them that the defendant
had shot
54
him. 153 The abuser subsequently died from the gunshot wound. 1
The trial court refused to give a self-defense instruction to the jury because it determined that no evidence of self-defense existed. 55 Interestingly, on
appeal, the defendant did not assign error to this ruling. 56 Given the abovementioned analysis in Smith, however, it is both unfortunate and not surprising
that the defendant did not do so. The court's strict interpretation of the maleoriented concept of self-defense shows the discrimination and unfairness that
results in such cases involving battered women who strike back against their
abuser. The defendant utilized the services of an expert psychologist, who testified that the defendant was "a classic battered spouse" that had suffered physical
and emotional abuse by the deceased and her former husband. 5 7 The lower

145

State v. Riley, 500 S.E.2d 524 (W. Va. 1997).

146

See supra note 116.

147

Riley, 500 S.E.2d at 527.

148

Id. at 528.

149 Id.
150 Id.
151

Id.

152

Id.

153

Id. at 527.

154 Id.
155
Id. at 528 n.2.

Id.
Id. at 528. The record indicates that she was married to her former abusive husband for
twenty-nine years. Id. The expert psychologist testified that battered spouses, even after an abu156
157
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court allowed the expert to testify as to those limited facts on which his medical
conclusions were based, but noted that any other hearsay 1evidence
could not be
58
used as direct evidence of the decedent's past abusive acts.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in reflecting on its previous decisions, noted that the BWS evidence has been found admissible in West
Virginia for three purposes on behalf of a criminal defendant.1 59 The court
stated those three purposes as follows:
First, [evidence of the BWS] can be used to determine the defendant's mental state where self-defense is asserted.' 6° Second, it can be used to negate criminal intent. 161 Finally, in State
v. Wyatt, we discussed the potential use of the battered spouse
syndrome "to establish either the lack of malice, intention, or
awareness, and thus negate or tend to negate a necessary element of one or the other offenses charged.1 6 2 The discussion
in Wyatt, however, was rather cryptic, and
was neither ex63
syllabus.
the
to
elevated
nor
upon
pounded
The court, in affirming the trial court's decision, noted that the trial
court allowed the defendant to present "substantial evidence" on the issue of the
BWS. 164 Concerning the defendant's alleged error of the trial court in refusing
to allow the admission of certain testimony of others as to prior bad acts by the
deceased, the court stated the following: "Conferring the right of introduction
of evidence upon a defendant ... does not translate into authority to engage in
an unlimited foray into the issue [of the BWS]. The court still possesses the
right to limit the testimony; when
it becomes duplicative, the court may refuse
' 165
to accept additional witnesses."
5.

State v. Whittaker

In its most recent decision, the majority opinion of the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals in State v. Whittaker made all too clear the power of
trial courts to limit or prohibit the admission of certain evidence put forth on
sive relationship ends, continue to find themselves in further abusive relationships and "feel unable to break free from that abuse." Id. at 528 n.3.
158

159
160
161
162
163

Id. at 530.
Id. at 530 n.6.
See State v. Dozier, 255 S.E.2d 552, 555 (W. Va. 1979).
See State v. Lambert, 312 S.E.2d 31, 35 (W. Va. 1984).
State v. Wyatt, 482 S.E.2d 147, 159 (W. Va. 1996).
State v. Riley, 500 S.E.2d 524, 530 n.6 (W. Va. 1997).

164

Id. at 530.

165

Id.
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66
behalf of a battered woman who claims self-defense after killing her abuser.'
the per curiam veil in
Once again, the drafter of the majority opinion hid behind
67
announcing its decision against the battered woman.'
The defendant in Whittaker, a woman who suffered about ten years of
abuse at the hands of her boyfriend, was charged with first degree murder after
she shot her boyfriend inside her home.' 68 Over the course of the couple's relationship, the defendant, on many occasions, tried to obtain refuge from the
abuse for herself and her daughter 69 at various places, such as her pastor's
house, her aunt's house, and at a local battered women's shelter.' 70 The defendant also secured four separate domestic violence petitions against her boyfriend. '7' The abuse by the boyfriend to both the defendant and her daughter
consisted of "hitting, yelling, threats of death and bodily harm, throwing them
across the floor, torturing and eventually killing [the daughter's] pet cat and pet
rooster in front of her, and stalking."' 172 In addition to seeking the four protective orders, the defendant tried to end the relationship with her boyfriend and the
continuing violence in other, non-lethal ways, such as moving to various
places. 73 The defendant and her daughter sought refuge from the boyfriend at a
occasions, staying there anywhere from two
local women's shelter on numerous
17 4
days to three months at a time.
On the day of the shooting, the defendant and her daughter went to a
scheduled doctor's appointment, where afterwards they were threatened in the
parking lot by the boyfriend who was there waiting for them to exit the doctor's

167

State v. Whittaker, 650 S.E.2d 216 (W.Va.2007).
Id.

168

Id. at 222.

166

169 The daughter, who was nine years old at the time of the incident, was the child of both the
defendant and the deceased boyfriend. Id. at 221 & n.2.
170
Id.at 221.
171
Id. According to the record, three of the four protective orders were never served on the
boyfriend. Id. at 221-22. At the time of the boyfriend's death, one of the protective orders was
still pending. Id at 222. Defendant requested that the first protective order be dismissed and she
failed to appear at the final hearing of another. Id. at 222 n.4. Importantly, though the majority
recognized that the defendant caused two of the protective order petitions to be dismissed, it also
recognized that "fear of retaliation by [the boyfriend] may have motivated [the defendant] to
permit the dismissal of these filings." Id. at 232 n.20.
172 Id. at 221 n.3.
173 Id. at 222. On one such move, the defendant purchased a mobile home and moved it beside
her parents' house, but the boyfriend left his home and moved in with her anyway. Id. Later, the
defendant and her daughter left the home and stayed at a hospital so they could be protected by
security. Id. Over time, the hospital personnel told them to go to a woman's shelter. Id. The
record states that during the defendant's stay at the woman's shelter, the county sheriff's department tried to serve the boyfriend with a domestic violence petition, but was unsuccessful. Id. The
record also states that the boyfriend had knowledge of the petition. Id. After leaving the shelter,
the defendant and her daughter stayed at her aunt's house. Id.
174
Id. at 222 n.5.
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office building.1 75 After driving to various places, the three of them returned to
the defendant's home.1 76 When they entered the home, the boyfriend picked up
the nine-year-old daughter by her hair and her shirt and, as the defendant testified, "rolled her.., across the floor like [a] bowlin[g] ball.' 77 Fearing what the
boyfriend would do next, the defendant picked up the boyfriend's .38 caliber
revolver from a kitchen cabinet and fired one shot.178 The shot, made from seventeen feet away from the boyfriend, hit him between the eyes, killing him instantly. 179 According to the record, the defendant then panicked and placed a
boyfriend's hand to aid her self-defense claim.' 80 She
shotgun in the deceased
8
then called the police.'1
The defendant was then charged with first-degree murder. 82 At the
close of her trial the jury found her guilty of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced her to ten years in prison. 183 The defendant then appealed, arguing,
among other things, that the jury erred in not acquitting her based on selfdefense and that the court erred in limiting the testimony of her defense witnesses. 184 In affirming the trial court's ruling, the West Virginia Supreme Court
that sufficient evidence existed to deny the defendant's motion
of Appeals held
85
acquittal.1
for
Whitaker is all-too-recent proof of the inadequacies of the traditional
self-defense laws in West Virginia and how those inadequacies unfairly prosecute those battered women who fall through the cracks of an ineffective government system and who resort to self-help when the current government system

176

Id. at 222.
Id.

177

Id.

175

178 Id.
179
180
181
182

Id. at 222, 224.
Id. at 222.
Id.
Id. at 223.

183

Id.

184

Id. at 221, 223. Unfortunately, defense counsel did not raise the issue of defense of others

in the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Id. at 226. This is surprising given the defendant's testimony that she shot the boyfriend right after he abused their nine-year-old daughter
because the defendant was afraid of what he would do next. Id. at 222. Due to defense counsel's
failure to raise this claim in the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals did not address whether the evidence supported such a claim for the
defendant. Id. at 226 n. 16.
185
Id. at 233. Among the evidence presented by the State was that the defendant knew the
location of the gun in the home; the defendant shot the boyfriend between the eyes from seventeen
feet away, even though she testified that she never used the gun before; the defendant had to walk
through the boyfriend's blood in order to retrieve the shotgun that she placed in the deceased
boyfriend's hand; and the defendant gave varying statements to police about the shooting. Id. at
224-25.
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fails them. 8 6 The West Virginia court system failed the defendant in this case
because the battered woman was forced to use the traditional defense of selfdefense and the evidentiary limitations that went with it. These evidentiary
limitations, as the court termed "inadmissible hearsay," precluded the defendant
from fully developing her claim of self-defense because she was not able to relay to the jury through certain witnesses "the full extent of abuse she had suffered" at the hands of her abuser. 8 7 Her witnesses included a pastor of a church
where the defendant and her daughter tried to find relief from the abuse and the
defendant's two aunts, one of which had provided shelter to the defendant and
her daughter during the days just prior to the shooting.188 These witnesses were
prohibited from testifying as to what the defendant told them concerning the
abuse the defendant had received from her boyfriend, even though some of the
defendant's statements were made just days before and on the day of the shooting. ' 89 The State, on the other hand, was allowed to admit into evidence statements that the defendant made to police officers, though the statements were not
"recorded to preserve her exculpatory comments."' 90 The prohibitions placed
on the admissibility of the defendant's out-of-court statements proving abuse,
coupled with the free admissibility of the defendant's out-of-court statements to
police officers, makes clear the sheer unfairness of the traditional defense of
self-defense's burdens of proof and how the current evidentiary rules exacerbate
those burdens.' 9'
186

As stated previously, the battered defendant in Whitaker sought four separate protective

orders against her boyfriend, two of which were withdrawn by her action or inaction-most likely
due to threats from the boyfriend if the petitions continued. Id. at 221-22, 232 n.20. The county
police department was unsuccessful in serving one of the four protective order petitions on the
boyfriend, although the boyfriend had knowledge of the petition. Id. at 222. The defendant
moved residences multiple times to avoid the boyfriend and the inevitable abuse, but to no avail.
Id. Hospital personnel directed her out of the hospital and to a local woman's shelter after the
battered woman and her young daughter sought shelter and protection there. Id. The woman
stayed at the shelter on multiple occasions, staying from two days to three months at a time. Id. at
222 n.5. Still, the abuse continued. The evidence clearly shows that the system failed the battered
woman and her nine-year-old daughter. The woman sought non-lethal relief through the system
numerous times, only to be spit back into society where her abuser was waiting. The abuser was
free, his victim was not. After ten years of abuse and numerous failed attempts at legal relief,
what did society expect her to do when the abuser picked up her young daughter by the hair and
shirt and threw her down the hall? How did society expect her to react to continued beatings and
threats of death and great bodily harm to herself and her daughter? Now, because the failed system left a battered woman to fend for herself, the abuser is dead and the failed system sent the
abused victim to prison.
187
Id. at 227.
188
Id. at 227-29.
189

Id.

190

Id. at 23 1.

191 The evidentiary analysis in Whitaker illuminates both the unfairness of the current system
and the majority's and concurrence's ignorance of the circumstances surrounding battered women.
The majority stated the defendant's burden under the current defense of self-defense as follows:
"In order to prove that she shot [the boyfriend] in self-defense, [the defendant] would also need to
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The majority opinion openly, but emptily, recognizes the plight of a battered woman in the legal system. 192 Though the majority rules against the battered woman and upholds her prison sentence, it "remain[s] deeply troubled by
the facts underlying this case." 193 The majority plainly admits that, "[slimply
put, our law enforcement/criminal justice system utterly failed" the defendant
and her daughter. 94 However, recognition of a perpetual problem in the legal
system, without more, will not set free the battered women defendants, the true
victims in these cases. Lastly, the court concluded, without proposing a solution, such as the restructuring of the state's defense of self-defense or evidentiary rules to properly and fairly handle battered women cases, that pawning off
the domestic violence problem onto the other branches of government was a
better solution: "Although our decision of this case stands firm, we nonetheless
wish to renew our continuing commitment to ensuring the safety, security, and

establish that she had had an abusive relationship with [the boyfriend] in which he was the aggressor." Id. at 228. Once the majority laid down this rule, it then proceeded to deny the defendant
the opportunity to put forth evidence proving the existence of an abusive relationship and the
defendant's state of mind in that relationship. Id. at 228-29. In an abusive relationship, it is common knowledge that the relationship centers on control. This control can take many forms, but
can consist of physical, mental, emotional, financial, and social control. With the realities of the
BWS facing the court for over twenty years, see State v. Steele, 359 S.E.2d 558, 563 (W. Va.
1987), the court should be intimately aware that batterers greatly limit the contact their victims
have with the outside world, including family members. A battered woman may have only a
handful of people with whom she can communicate the abuse, such as family members and clergy
persons, as was seen in this case. Given this reality, to exclude the testimony of the few persons
with whom the battered woman has been able to discuss the abuse, is to effectively deny the
abused victim a claim of self-defense. If the burden falls on the abused to put forth evidence of
the abuse in a traditional self-defense claim, but the abuser severely limits his victim's access to
admissible mediums for proving that abuse and the court prohibits the only real evidence of abuse
(the defendant's out-of-court statements to family and clergy persons in pursuit of shelter from the
abuse) but allows the admissibility of the defendant's out-of-court statements to police, then a
battered woman has no hope of successfully proving self-defense under the current evidentiary
rules and traditional self-defense laws.
192 Whitaker, 650 S.E.2d at 232-33.
193 Id. at 232. The majority continued its solution-less recognition of the problem surrounding
self-defense cases involving battered women by stating as follows:
Under no circumstances do we condone vigilante justice. However, we sympathize with the plight in which [the defendant] found herself after her numerous attempts to seek help from law enforcement authorities were unsuccessful.
[The defendant's] domestic violence petitions were not served on [the boyfriend], and, thus, they were not enforced. Simply put, our law enforcement/criminal justice system utterly failed [the defendant] and [her daughter].
Perhaps even more troubling, though, is the fact that [the defendant's] case is
not an isolated incident; we previously have been asked to review the convictions of domestic violence victims who have felt the need to end the cycle of
abuse by resort to whatever means were at their disposal.

Id. at 232-33 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
194

Id at 233.
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dignity of victims of domestic abuse, and we encourage our coordinate branches
of government to do likewise."' 9'
Whitaker begs for reform of the current system where battered women
are involved. In addition to the majority's empty recognition of the continuing
problem, two dissenting justices put forth stinging opinions against the majority's analysis and ultimate holding. 96 Justice Albright's dissenting opinion
states that, "[t]he majority demonstrates an inability to fully comprehend the
underpinnings of the battered spouse syndrome by upholding, with minimal
analysis, the trial court's evidentiary rulings."1 97 The dissent convincingly argues that the defendant should have been allowed to put forth evidence of her
out-of-court statements of abuse, and that denying her the right to do so
"wrongly prevented [the jury] from hearing evidence that might have tipped the
scales in favor of Appellant's affirmative defense that she was acting in self
195

Id. at 233.

196

Id. at 233-36 (Albright, J., dissenting); Id. at 236 (Starcher, J., dissenting). Justice May-

nard's concurring opinion, unconvincingly titled, "the rest of the story," makes clear that he truly
does not understand the plight of battered women. Id. at 237 (Maynard, J., concurring). Unfortunately, his concurring opinion was the third vote necessary to uphold the battered defendant's
conviction (3-2 decision). This clear lack of understanding or compassion is evident in his statement, as follows:
My dissenting colleagues.., would have you believe that the appellant was a
battered woman who, after suffering mental and physical abuse by [the boyfriend] for ten years, shot him in self-defense and that because of certain rulings by the trial court, which were affirmed by the majority, she was prevented from offering evidence of that abuse. That is a preposterous and outrageous claim and is simply not what happened. The record in this case
shows that [the defendant] shot and killed an unarmed man.
Id. Justice Maynard conveniently forgets that the boyfriend, who had been drinking at the time of
the shooting, was armed with one of the most prevalent and effective weapons in battered women
cases-his fists. It is unreasonable for anyone to require an abuser to have a firearm or other
similar weapon in hand before a battered woman can defend herself. Such a statement by the
concurring opinion shows ignorance of the battered woman's daily environment, as the abuser can
just as easily kill his victim with his fists or a glass bottle than he could with a firearm or a knife.
In addition, Justice Maynard's concurring opinion recognizes that the defendant had many opportunities to get away from her abuser on the day she shot him. Id. Again, this demonstrates the
Justice's lack of understanding or recognition of the absolute control the abuser has over his victim. See id. at 233-34 (Albright, J., dissenting) ("Sadly, the paradigm presented by a battered
spouse is an individual who is prevented by emotional or financial obstacles, or both, from permanently escaping the environs of the abusing spouse."). Justice Albright, in his dissenting opinion, answers this incorrect assumption of the battered woman's ability to freely leave the abusive
relationship as follows: "Many lay people have difficulty comprehending why an act of violence
was committed by a battered woman at a time when she may have seemingly had the opportunity
to extricate herself from the situation. This societal misapprehension stems from an inability to
fully grasp that, from the perspective of the battered wife, the danger is constantly immediate."
Id. at 235 (Albright, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Such incorrect beliefs of the circumstances
surrounding battered women and their abusers, such as Justice Maynard's concurring opinion,
place the rights of the abusers above those of their victims and hamper the progress of the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in protecting the rights of battered women.
197
Id. at 233 (Albright, J., dissenting).
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defense when she shot [her boyfriend]-the man who had inflicted both mental
and physical abuse upon her for ten long years."' 98 Such evidence of abuse is
necessary to a battered woman's claim of self-defense because, "[o]nly when
the jury has been permitted to hear and consider all of the factual information
surrounding the incident, which includes a full history of prior threats and past
defendant had reasonable grounds
beatings, can it properly evaluate whether the' 99
to believe that she was in immediate danger."'
As the above analysis of the West Virginia cases makes clear, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has allowed evidence of the BWS for three
distinct purposes, 2°° but does not allow evidence of the battered woman's own
out-of-court statements of past abuse, even if those statements were made on the
same day as the killing.2 0 1 The limitations placed on the admissibility of the
battered woman's evidence, whether evidence of the BWS or previous acts of
abuse, make the totality of admissible evidence highly insufficient in battered
women cases when used in conjunction with the traditional defense of selfdefense. As the following section discusses, evidence of both the BWS and
prior acts of violence can only truly benefit a battered women's claim of selfdefense when a Battered Women Defense is made available to her.
IV. ARGUMENT FOR ADOPTION OF THE BATTERED WOMEN DEFENSE IN WEST
VIRGINIA

West Virginia needs to adopt a Battered Women Defense to adequately
address self-defense claims by battered women who kill their abusers. As the
previous section makes clear, West Virginia's adherence to its static self198

Id. (Albright, J., dissenting). The dissent argues that the evidence of the defendant's out-of-

court statements to her aunt made on the same day that the boyfriend was shot "clearly were not
too remote to be relevant to Appellant's state of mind." Id.
199
Id. at 234 (Albright, J., dissenting). The dissent further argues that the majority "downplays
the significance" of the defendant's out-of-court statements made to others at the time of the abusive incidences. Id. As the dissent explains, "[wihat the majority overlooks... is that by preventing the jury from hearing these statements, the jury was denied information that was relevant to
[the defendant's] mental state-evidence which was offered to explain her actions and tended to
support her theory that she acted in self-defense." Id.
200
The three purposes for which the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has allowed
evidence of the BWS are as follows:
First, [evidence of the BWS] can be used to determine the defendant's mental
state where self-defense is asserted. Second, it can be used to negate criminal
intent. Finally, in State v. Wyatt, we discussed the potential use of the battered
spouse syndrome "to establish either the lack of malice, intention, or awareness, and thus negate or tend to negate a necessary element of one or the other
offenses charged.
State v. Riley, 500 S.E.2d 524, 530 n.6 (W. Va. 1997) (citing State v. Dozier, 255 S.E.2d 552, 555
(W. Va. 1979); State v. Lambert, 312 S.E.2d 31, 35 (W. Va. 1984); State v. Wyatt, 482 S.E.2d
147, 159 (W. Va. 1996)). See supra notes 159-163 and accompanying text.
201
Whittaker, 650 S.E.2d at 227-29. See supra notes 187-191 and accompanying text.
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defense doctrine in such cases produces harsh and unfair results for the abused
defendant. As this Part will discuss, the defense of self-defense is inadequate in
these cases because of its foundation in a traditional, male-oriented setting.
Adoption of a Battered Women Defense would alleviate this unfairness and
would provide the court with a useful, nondiscriminatory standard with which to
evaluate the battered woman's self-defense claim.
A.

Inadequaciesof the TraditionalDefense of Self-Defense in Battered
Women Cases

The statutory and common law in West Virginia does not adequately
address the dilemma of women who fight back against their abusive partner. As
a result, the traditional defense of self-defense is discriminatory toward women
in domestic abuse situations and deprives them of the right to a fair trial. West
Virginia, therefore, needs to adopt a new, separate defense-a narrowly tailored
version of self-defense-for women in domestic violence situations.
As previously stated, the law of self-defense in West Virginia is as follows:
[A] defendant who is not the aggressor and has reasonable
grounds to believe, and actually does believe, that he is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm from which he
could save himself only by using deadly force against his asthe right to employ deadly force in order to defend
sailant has
20 2
himself.
Thus, a battered woman who strikes back against her abuser must meet the following requirements: (1) objective reasonableness, (2) subjective reasonableness, (3) imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm, and (4) proportionality of force against the imminent threat. 20 3 To support the battered woman's
self-defense theory, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has held that
she may offer evidence of the BWS. 2° Such evidence most frequently takes the
form of expert testimony, and can be used "to explain the psychological basis
for the battered woman's syndrome and to offer an opinion that the defendant
meets the requisite profile of the syndrome., 20 5 The court has stated that the
BWS evidence in self-defense cases will be used to determine the defendant's
mental state. 20 6 This mental state goes to the subjective reasonableness reState v. Headley, 558 S.E.2d 324, 328 (W. Va. 2001) (quoting State v. W.J.B., 276 S.E.2d
550, 553 (W. Va. 1981)).
202

203

See id.

204

See State v. Steele, 359 S.E.2d 558 (W. Va. 1987); State v. Riley, 500 S.E.2d 524 (W. Va.

1997).
Syl. Pt. 5, Steele, 359 S.E.2d at 558; Syl. Pt. 4, Riley, 500 S.E.2d at 524.
See State v. Dozier, 255 S.E.2d 552, 555 (W. Va. 1979).
206
205
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quirement of self-defense. °7 However helpful, this evidence does not go nearly
far enough to bolster the battered woman's defense because it does nothing for
the objective reasonableness, imminence, and proportionality requirements.
Theoretically, the BWS evidence should not only show, under the specific facts of a given case, why the battered woman's conduct was reasonable,
but it should also prove that her actions were "necessary and proportionate by
showing how the [woman] could perceive a threat of imminent danger in verbal
threats alone, in a nondeadly [sic] attack from an unarmed spouse, or from a
sleeping man. 2 °8 When the battered woman can only use such evidence to determine her mental state, she is placed at a great disadvantage. This disadvantage is seen in each of the West Virginia cases analyzed above because none of
the battered women attempting a defense of self-defense based on the BWS
were successful at trial or on appeal. This unfortunate result is the product of
strict interpretation of a discriminatory, out-dated, male-oriented version of selfdefense that has little relation to the circumstances surrounding many abused
women. 20 9 As one commentator stated, "One reason the resulting cases [of selfdefense involving battered women] are difficult is that they do not fit neatly into
the categories of good and evil drawn by the criminal law., 2 10 The continuing
plight of battered women who must resort to the traditional notion of selfdefense can be summarized as follows:
American courts and criminal justice officials have a difficult
time dealing with these cases because they often involve sympathetic defendants who cannot fairly be blamed for their conduct but who would have no defense if the law was strictly applied.2 1'
Thus, a new, alternate, Battered Women Defense, similar to the traditional defense of self-defense, is necessary to properly account for those cases involving
battered women.
B.

ProposedStructure of the Battered Women Defense

The Battered Women Defense, narrowly tailoring the defense of selfdefense and changing the gender of the actor, would read as follows:
207

Rosen, supra note 15, at 41.

208

Id.

209

See Rosen, supra note 15, at 34 (stating that the traditional notion of self-defense and the

requirements of the defense derived therefrom were originally developed for situations involving a
man who kills another man of comparative size and strength during a single, threatened attack in
order to protect himself or his family).
210
Rosen, supra note 15.
211

Id.
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A defendant who is not the aggressor and has, as a reasonable
battered woman, reasonable grounds to believe, and actually
does believe, that she is in imminent danger of death or serious
bodily harm from which she could save herself only by using
deadly force against her assailant has the right to employ deadly
force in order to defend herself. 212 Under this standard, the reasonableness of the defendant's beliefs in the imminence of the
danger of death or serious bodily harm and the need to use
deadly force must be judged against both the defendant's own
subjective beliefs and those of a reasonable battered woman in
the same or similar circumstances.
In cases where evidence is submitted indicating that the defendant is a
woman who has suffered a history of domestic violence and who suffers from
the BWS, the defendant may properly use the defense of Battered Women Defense and is entitled to a jury instruction thereon. One main difference between
the Battered Women Defense and the traditional defense of self-defense is the
application of the objective reasonableness standard. The traditional defense of
self-defense includes both a subjective and an objective standard of reasonableness.21 3 However, a woman suffering from the BWS cannot be judged by a traditional objective standard of reasonableness because her abusive environment
has altered her mental state.214 The proper utilization of expert testimony on the
BWS requires analysis under a subjective standard of reasonableness.2 15
Even though a strictly subjective standard would greatly improve a battered woman's defense, however, it may lead to results contrary to public policy. Specifically, if the objective standard of reasonableness is completely removed and replaced with a standard that relies solely on what the specific battered woman subjectively believed during the event in question, the court risks
encouraging conduct that may have otherwise been erroneous and entirely unnecessary.216 Therefore, both a subjective reasonableness standard and a narrowly tailored "objective" reasonableness standard are needed in battered
women cases to remove this harmful possibility. This narrowly tailored "objective" reasonable person standard would become an otherwise reasonable person
who suffers from the BWS standard, or a "reasonable battered woman" stanThe structure of this proposed defense is based on the language of the traditional defense of
self-defense as used by the court in State v. Headley. State v. Headley, 558 S.E.2d 324, 328 (W.
Va. 2001) (citing State v. W.J.B., 276 S.E.2d 550, 553 (W. Va. 1981)).
213
DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 222.
See State v. Wyatt, 482 S.E.2d 147, 159 (W. Va. 1996) (stating that the West Virginia Su214
212

preme Court of Appeals recognizes Battered Women's Syndrome as "a particularized version of
post-traumatic stress disorder, of which.., rape trauma syndrome is another example").
215
Rosen, supra note 15, at n.170.
216

See id. at 21.
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dard.217 As one commentator notes, there is strength in favor of such a standard
of evaluation because "[o]nly then can a jury fully evaluate the reasonableness
of the defendant's actions., 218 Thus, the proper application of the Battered
Women Defense would require analysis under both a subjective reasonableness
standard and a narrowly tailored "reasonable battered woman" standard.
1.

The Battered Women Defense Would Allow an Expanded View
of the Traditional Imminence Requirement

Requiring evaluation under a "reasonable battered woman" standard, as
opposed to the traditional, male-oriented "objective" standard, would greatly
improve a battered woman's opportunity to convince the jury that her actions in
killing her abuser were necessary in light of the perceived imminent threat imposed on her by her abuser. 219 This expanded view of imminence would allow a
battered woman to present a viable claim of self-defense, using the Battered
Women Defense, in both confrontational and non-confrontational cases.22 °
The Supreme Court of Washington, in Washington v. Wanrow, used a
subjective reasonableness standard and took an expanded view of the imminence requirement. 2 1 The court addressed a claim of self-defense by a woman
who, though not abused or battered by her child-molesting "victim," nonetheless
had knowledge of her "victim' s" reputation for aggressive acts based on events
that occurred long before the shooting occurred. 2222 One of the errors committed
by the trial court at issue was the giving of a jury instruction on self-defense
which directed the jury to consider the events occurring "at or immediately before the killing., 223 The court, in reversing the woman's conviction and remanding for a new trial, held that the jury instruction was contrary to Washington's law of self-defense and that "the justification of self-defense is to be
evaluated in light of all the facts and circumstances known to the defendant,
including those known substantially before the killing., 224 Interestingly, the
language of the jury instruction that was held invalid in that case is very similar
to the language of self-defense used by the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals. Specifically, the language of the jury instruction that was held invalid
is stated as follows:

217

218
219
220
221

Shad, supra note 30, at 1173; see also Schopp et al., supra note 13, at 100-01.
Shad, supra note 30, at 1173.
See id. at 1175.
See id. at 1173.
State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 556-57 (Wash. 1977), superseded by statute on other

grounds, as stated in Lewis v. State, 139 P.3d 1078 (Wash. 2006).
222 Wanrow, 559 P.2d at 550, 557.
223
224

Id. at 555.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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To justify killing in self-defense .... there must be, or reasonably appear to be, at or immediately before the killing, some
overt act, or some circumstances which would reasonably indicate to the party killing that the person slain, is, at the time,225endeavoring to kill him or inflict upon him great bodily harm.
West Virginia's similar law on self-defense is stated, in part, as follows:
In a prosecution for murder, where self-defense is relied upon to
excuse the homicide, and there is evidence showing, or tending
to show, that the deceasedwas at the time of the killing, making
a murderous attack upon the defendant, it is competent for the
defense to prove the character or reputation of the deceased as a
dangerous and quarrelsome man, and also to prove prior attacks
made by the deceased upon him .... 226
Thus, though West Virginia does allow the defendant to prove the character or reputation of the deceased and to prove prior bad acts by the deceased,
the defense can only do so if there is evidence of a murderous attack by the deceased "at the time of the killing. 2 27 This requirement, in effect, precludes any
successful claim of self-defense by a battered woman in all non-confrontational
cases and any confrontational case where the evidence does not adequately convince the court that a murderous attack by the deceased occurred at the time the
defendant killed her abuser. This exclusion of crucial evidence seriously undermines and virtually destroys a battered woman's claim of self-defense where
she reasonably believed, and a reasonable battered woman would believe, that
she was in imminent danger of a murderous attack or serious bodily harm but
failed to convince the court that her belief was "objectively reasonable."
The Washington court stated that the following rule was firmly established in self-defense cases: "[T]he jury is entitled to consider all of the circumstances surrounding the incident in determining whether [the] defendant had
reasonable grounds to believe grievous bodily harm was about to be inflicted., 228 The court then emphasized that this evidence would then be used by
the jury in its evaluation of the "degree of force which ... a reasonable person
in the same situation... seeing what [s]he sees and knowing what [s]he knows,
225
226

Id. (emphasis added).
Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Louk, 301 S.E.2d 596 (W. Va. 1983) (emphasis added); Syl. Pt. 3, State

v. Gwinn, 228 S.E.2d 533 (W. Va. 1982); Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Hardin, 112 S.E. 401 (W. Va. 1922).
227
Syl. Pt. 2, Louk, 301 S.E.2d at 596 (emphasis added); Syl. Pt. 3, Gwinn, 228 S.E.2d at 533;
Syl. Pt. 1, Hardin, 112 S.E. at 401; see also State v. McClanahan, 454 S.E.2d 115, 118 (W. Va.
1994) ("[A]n apprehension of harm, to support a claim of self-defense, must be an apprehension
existing at the time of the defendant's attack on the victim.").
228
Wanrow, 559 P.2d at 556 (citing State v. Lewis, 491 P.2d 1062 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971))
(emphasis in original).
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then would believe to be necessary. '' 229 The Washington court then concluded
that the jury instruction must make clear that "the defendant's actions are to be
judged against her own subjective impressions and' 23 0not those which a detached
jury might determine to be objectively reasonable.
It is imperative that the West Virginia Supreme Court takes heed of the
reasonableness standard utilized by the Supreme Court of Washington and adopt
a similar standard. Such adoption should not take the form of a strictly subjective reasonableness standard, however, but must also include the standard of a
reasonable battered woman. This standard would be similar to the reasonable
woman standard advocated by the Washington court, except it would be tailored
to cases involving women who are battered. Thus, a West Virginia jury would,
in adding to the language quoted by the Washington court, consider all the facts
and circumstances known to the defendant, including those circumstances occurring before the killing, when making its evaluation of whether a reasonable
battered woman "in the same situation ... seeing what [s]he sees and knowing
what [s]he knows ... would believe to be" a necessary degree of force. 23" The
failure of the West Virginia Supreme Court to utilize such a standard in selfdefense cases involving battered women not only constitutes discrimination
under the law 23but
2 also violates the battered woman's right to equal protection
under the law.
229

230

Id. at 557 (citing State v. Dunning, 506 P.2d 321 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973)).
Id. at 558, superseded by statute on other grounds, as stated in Lewis v. State, 139 P.3d

1078 (Wash. 2006). See also State v. Painter, 620 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (confirming the proper use of the "subjective" test in self-defense cases is that "a defendant's actions
are to be judged against his or her own subjective impressions and not those which a detached jury
might determine to be objectively reasonable" and that a corresponding jury instruction must
include "the essential element that the person using the force need only reasonably believe, in
light of all the facts and circumstances known to him or her, that he or another person is in danger").
231
Wanrow, 559 P.2d at 557 (citing Dunning, 506 P.2d at 321).
232
See id. at 558, superseded by statute on other grounds, as stated in Lewis v. State, 139 P.3d
1078 (Wash. 2006). It is unfortunate that the male-oriented, objective reasonableness standard
used by the lower Washington court and chastised by the Supreme Court of Washington is similar
to the one used currently by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court of
Washington clearly and effectively articulated the error of the lower court in applying that maleoriented, objective reasonableness standard in self-defense cases involving women as follows:
The [jury instruction in question] not only establishes an objective standard,
but through the persistent use of the masculine gender leaves the jury with the
impression the objective standard to be applied is that applicable to an altercation between two men. The impression created-that a 5'4" woman with a
cast on her leg and using a crutch must, under the law, somehow repel an assault by a 6'2" intoxicated man without employing weapons in her defense,
unless the jury finds her determination of the degree of danger to be objectively reasonable-constitutes a separate and distinct misstatement of the law
and, in the context of this case, violates the respondent'sright to equal protection of the law. The respondent was entitled to have the jury consider her actions in the light of her own perceptions of the situation, including those perceptions which were the product of our nation's "long and unfortunate history
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The Battered Women Defense Must Be Categorized Under A
Theory of Excuse, Not Justification

The other necessary distinguishing feature that must be present in the
Battered Women Defense that is not present in the current analysis of selfdefense is the reliance on the theory of excuse, rather than justification.233 Under the current theory, "[]ustified conduct is conduct that will be encouraged or,
at least, tolerated under objectively identifiable circumstances that are not exclusive to the defendant., 234 This theory, however, is contrary to the use of the
BWS testimony in self-defense cases. The entire purpose of expert testimony
on the BWS in these cases is "to show why, under the particular circumstances
of the case, the defendant's conduct was reasonable .... 2 35 Again, as the West
Virginia Supreme Court has held, evidence of the BWS is admissible "to determine the defendant's mental state where self-defense is asserted. 23 6 This individualized use of expert testimony on the BWS is thus contradictory to the objectivity standard underlying the theory of justification. The problems with
categorizing self-defense under a theory of justification in cases involving battered women is summarized by one commentator as follows:
Today, most American jurisdictions classify self-defense as a
justification even though it traditionally developed as an excuse.
As a result, principles of excuse have become merged with
principles of justification in the law of self-defense. Consequently, results in some cases are illogical and inconsistent with
basic principles of criminal law. The problem is particularly apt
to arise when demands are made to justify self-help behavior
that is harmful to society in instances where the actor cannot
fairly be held blameworthy because of circumstances particular
to that individual. Battered women who kill their abusers present the paradigm example of such cases. Although the defenof sex discrimination." Until such time as the effects of that history are eradicated, care must be taken to assure that our self-defense instructions afford
women the right to have their conductjudged in light of the individualphysical handicapswhich are the product of sex discrimination. To fail to do so is
to deny the right of the individual woman involved to trial by the same rules
which are applicable to male defendants.
Id. at 558-59 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)) (emphasis added).
233
See State v. Kirtley, 252 S.E.2d 374, 381 (W. Va. 1978) (stating that West Virginia has
recognized that "the defense of self-defense constitutes a complete justification for a homicide");
Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Preece, 179 S.E. 524 (W. Va. 1935) (stating that self-defense is a justification
for homicide).
234
Rosen, supra note 15, at 21-22.
235
Id. at 41.
236
State v. Riley, 500 S.E.2d 524, 530 n.6 (W. Va. 1997) (per curiam) (citing State v. Dozier,
255 S.E.2d 552, 555 (W. Va. 1979)).
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dant's conduct is understandable, and absolving her from moral
blame is not difficult, we are hesitant to proclaim that the act
was justified and therefore to be encouraged.2 37
Self-defense as an excuse, on the other hand, "focuses on the actor's
subjective perceptions., 238 Further, viewing self-defense as an excuse "allows
the fact-finder to consider the whole individual and to evaluate whether, under
the circumstances, her life experience enabled her to choose between criminal
and noncriminal [sic] conduct. If her inability to choose was reasonable or understandable, she is not culpable., 239 Viewing the Battered Women Defense as
an excuse would also accommodate the alteration of the current objective reasonableness standard to the narrowly tailored reasonable battered woman standard. Thus, categorizing the Battered Women Defense under a theory of excuse
would more adequately accommodate the purpose of the BWS testimony and
would more appropriately explain the rationale behind the battered woman's
actions than does the current theory of justification. 2 °
C.

Criticisms of the Battered Women Defense are Overestimated and Inaccurate

It is conceded that adopting an excuse-based Battered Women Defense
that makes use of a "reasonable battered woman" standard would bring criticism
by some. One concern of commentators is that by focusing on the history of
abuse and the psychological harm imposed on the battered woman, the jury will
forget or overlook the rights of the abuser. 241 The argument is that such evidence may suggest that the abuser's right to life is somehow less important than
the life of the battered woman.24 2 Another concern of commentators is that relaxing the standards of self-defense to properly account for battered women in
self-defense cases will encourage women in domestic violence situations to retaliate against their abusers without first seeking alternate, non-lethal methods.243 This view was supported by the majority of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina in State v. Norman.244 The Norman majority believed that relaxing the
237

Rosen, supra note 15, at 45-46.

238

Id. at 22.

Id. at 23. Specifically, the article noted that by including a particular psychological trait of a
battered woman, such as expert testimony on the BWS, the court has taken the analysis closer to
one of excuse than of justification. Id. at 42.
240 See id.; see also Shad, supra note 30, at 1174.
241
See Rosen, supra note 15, at 50.
239

242

See id.

243

See id. at 53.

244

378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (emphasis in original). For a detailed discussion of this case, see

infra Part IV.E.
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traditional requirements of self-defense in cases involving battered women
would have the following result:
The relaxed requirements for perfect self-defense . .. would
tend to categorically legalize the opportune killing of abusive
husbands by their wives solely on the basis of the wives' testimony concerning their subjective speculation as to the probability of future felonious assaults by their husbands. Homicidal
self-help would then become a lawful solution, and245perhaps the
easiest and most effective solution, to this problem.
A final criticism is that, under a slippery slope theory, the relaxation of the objective self-defense standard in cases involving battered women could lead to
relaxation of the standard in "any type of case in which a defendant testified that
he or she subjectively' 246believed that killing was necessary and proportionate to
any perceived threat.
These criticisms, however, are overestimated and are inaccurately based
on a theory of justification where only a subjective standard of reasonableness is
used. Though a battered woman who successfully argues her case under the
excuse-based Battered Women Defense would be granted an acquittal, the court
would not be holding that her actions were justified or encouraged under the
law. 4 7 It follows, then, that just because a court in one instance excuses the
actions of a battered woman based on an examination of the totality of the circumstances in that particular case does not mean that a future person, woman or
man, would be given an automatic legal right to kill another who finds herself or
himself in the same or similar situation.248 In addition, limiting the use of the
Battered Women Defense to only those women who have a history of abuse and
who exhibit symptoms of the BWS would greatly reduce the number of women
who could utilize the defense and actually be granted an acquittal.249 One commentator, who advocated the adoption of an excuse-based self-defense theory,
explained the following rationale for why battered women should be excused
while others should not:
Because [a] defendant responded to internal and external coercive pressures, for which she was not responsible but which
were created by her social reality as a battered woman, she is
not to blame for her conduct. A person who did not suffer from

245
246
247
248
249

Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
See Rosen, supra note 15, at 55.
See id. at 32.
See id. at 43.
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battered woman syndrome, however, would be culpable under
identical external circumstances.2 5 °
In addition, just because a woman claims to be battered, kills her husband, and claims the Battered Women Defense, does not mean that she will be
acquitted. She will still have to put forth sufficient evidence to satisfy both the
subjective reasonableness and the more objective "reasonable battered woman"
requirements. If the defendant fails to show either that a reasonable belief of an
imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury existed or that a reasonable
belief in the proportionality of force used against the imminent threat existed,
then a conviction would surely follow. 2 5 ' Thus, adoption of an excuse-based
Battered Women Defense would not justify the woman's conduct as right and
proper and would not create the risk of judicially authorized homicide as critics
suggest. 252 It would, however, provide battered women who kill their abusive
partners with a fair trial "without threatening important values promoted by the
criminal law,253such as the suppression of private retaliation and the sanctity of
human life.,
D.

HypotheticalSituation Applying Current West Virginia Self-Defense
Law

The following hypothetical situation involving a battered woman is used
to counter the above criticisms and to illustrate the pressing need for a change in
the current self-defense law in battered women cases in West Virginia. The
hypothetical situation is as follows: A 23-year-old woman has been married to a
34-year-old male for the past five years, and the couple has two young girls,
ages four and two. During the first year of marriage, the woman's husband was
generally kind to her but was often argumentative and bossy. During the second
250

Id. at 43.

The commentator further described the excuse-based self-defense theory and

addressed critics' concern of a further reduction of the reasonableness requirement in other cases
as follows:
Excuse recognizes that, even though self-help may not be desirable and may
harm society, such conduct often results from a person's understandable inability to choose an alternative course of action due to overwhelming external
or internal pressures. Treatment of self-defense as an excuse accommodates
the defensive needs of battered women ... who act in subjectively reasonable
fear given their social reality. It allows the fact-finder to consider the defender's subjective beliefs without risking the possibility that all bona fide defensive acts, no matter how objectively unreasonable, will be condoned by the
criminal law. Concomitantly, it furthers the criminal law's goals of preserving life and discouraging self-help.
Id. at 56.
251 See Shad, supra note 30, at 1174.
252
See Rosen, supra note 15, at 54-56.
253 Rosen, supra note 15, at 17.
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year, however, he became more and more domineering, constantly asking her
where she had been and to whom she had spoken. During these confrontations,
he would accuse her of cheating on him and would throw and break dishes, his
beer bottles, and whatever small objects were within his reach. None of these
objects were thrown directly at the wife, but it frightened her and the two young
children. Each time she would truthfully deny his accusations, but with each
denial he became more and more angry. At the end of the second year and into
the third, the marriage became more hostile. The husband's jealous thoughts
intensified and he refused to allow her to see any of her friends or to call her
mother, with whom she was very close.
On one occasion, when he caught his wife talking to her mother on the
telephone, he became furious, ripped the phone off the wall, and threw it across
the room, nearly hitting their youngest daughter. He then slapped his wife in the
face and said if he caught her on the phone again, he would cut her throat. After
this event, the husband became more and more physical with his wife. ff dinner
was not cooked to his satisfaction or if he believed the house was not straightened as it should be, he would slap or strike her. During the latter part of the
third and into the fourth year of marriage, the oldest child, then three, began to
shy away from her father and to become scared when he entered the room. The
wife noticed that the child's underwear was sometimes soiled and there was
often redness around the child's private parts. When the wife inquired to the
husband what would cause this, he became infuriated, denied any knowledge as
to the cause, and began repeatedly beating his wife. He said that if she ever
mentioned the subject again, he would tie her up, kill their daughters in front of
her, and cut her throat.
Thereafter, cursing, yelling, and beatings were a daily occurrence. The
wife attempted to contact friends or family, but each time she was caught and
beaten more severely. On one occasion, she found the car keys her husband had
hidden from her and drove herself and her two daughters to her mother's house
to escape her abusive husband. She knew she could not contact the police because if her husband found out she had reported his behavior he would surely
kill her, their daughters, and possibly her mother. The next morning, while her
mother was away at the store and she was playing with her daughters in her
mother's yard, her husband pulled up in his truck, got out, struck his wife in the
face, and yelled hysterically at her for leaving him. He put their daughters into
the truck, grabbed his wife by the hair, and threw her into the passenger seat of
the truck. He threatened that if she ever left the house again he would torture
and kill her, their daughters, and her mother for helping her escape. When they
arrived at their home, he took the children to their room and closed the door. He
then dragged his wife into the basement and tied her to a chair, stating that now
she would never be able to escape again.
For the next several days, the husband kept his wife tied in the basement. When her mother inquired as to her whereabouts, her husband replied
that she was ill and could not receive visitors. He would bring his wife table
scraps in the family dog's food bowl and left the dog's water bowl in front of
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her to drink. He would then go back upstairs and lock the basement door.
When he came down to visit her, he often told her their girls thought she had
abandoned them. He informed her that the oldest daughter, now four, gave him
more sexual enjoyment than she ever did. After beating and raping his wife, he
would sit for hours and mock her. The wife noticed that the husband had a key
on a string around his neck. He saw her staring at it and told her that it was the
basement door key, his assurance that she would not desert him again. The
wife, after enduring this torture for days, was frantically concerned about the
well-being of her daughters. She didn't know what her husband was doing to
them or even if they were still alive.
On one later occasion the husband again came down to "visit" her. This
time she could tell he had been drinking heavily. He said that she would not be
in the basement much longer, because he was growing tired of walking down
the basement stairs. He said that death would be much better for her. He then
proceeded to beat her more violently than he ever had, knocking her unconscious. When she awoke, she realized that her pants and underwear had been
removed and she felt sharp pain throughout her body. She looked to her right
and saw her husband slumped down in a chair beside her. He was sound asleep,
snoring loudly. She noticed the basement key hanging around his neck. She
also noticed that the rope that tied her hands together was slightly loosened. She
figured that it must have become loosened during the beatings and because her
husband was drunk he must not have noticed.
She then realized her chance of escape. She wiggled the ropes until her
wrists were free, untied herself, quietly walked up the basement steps, and tried
to turn the doorknob. The door was locked. She then remembered the key. She
returned to where her husband was sleeping. She tried to find a way to remove
the key from around his neck without waking him, but could not do so. She
knew she had to act quickly because her husband would soon awake and she
knew this was her only chance to escape and rescue herself and her daughters.
She frantically searched the basement to find something to cut the chain without
waking her husband. She found an old metal pair of scissors and went over to
her sleeping husband. She tried to cut the chain, but was unsuccessful. She
knew that if he awoke and found her untied he would surely kill her and possibly kill their daughters if he hadn't already. She tried one more time to cut the
chain and when she pulled on it, her husband, though still asleep, moved in the
chair making a grunting noise. This movement and noise startled her, so she
thrust the point of the metal scissors into her sleeping husband's neck, killing
him. She then grabbed the key, ran up the stairs, unlocked the door, and called
for her young daughters. She found them sound asleep in their beds. Though
she did not thoroughly examine them, they did not appear to have been beaten
254
or starved. She quickly gathered them up and drove to her mother's house.
For those readers who may feel that the facts of this hypothetical are too graphic, unreasonable, and outlandish to be humanly possible, please read the facts contained in State v. Norman,
366 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. App. 1988), overruled by State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989). See
254
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Soon afterwards, the wife was charged with the murder of her husband.
At trial, the battered defendant sought a defense under West Virginia's current,
traditional, male-oriented self-defense law, as it was the only self-defense law
available to her. However, this case involved a non-confrontational homicide.
The trial court, therefore, did not allow her theory of self-defense to go to the
jury because her husband was asleep at the time of the killing, indicating that
she was not "under an apprehension of danger existing at the time she [killed]
her husband .... ,,255 Because the trial court ruled that self-defense was not a
also infra Part I.E. (providing a detailed discussion of the Norman case). The facts of that unfortunate and frustrating case are more graphic and appalling that this simple hypothetical, and
represents the possible, real-world, vicious, inhumane treatment of a battered woman at the hands
of her cowardly, vile husband over a twenty year period. Norman, 366 S.E.2d at 586.
255
See State v. McClanahan, 454 S.E.2d 115, 118 (W. Va. 1994) ("[An apprehension of harm,
to support a claim of self-defense, must be an apprehension existing at the time of the defendant's
attack on the victim."); Syl. Pt. 6, State v. McMillion, 138 S.E. 732, 733 (W. Va. 1927) ("No
apprehension of danger previously entertained will justify the commission of the homicide; it
must be an apprehension existing at the time the defendant fired the fatal shot."); State v. Riley,
500 S.E.2d 524, 528 n.2 (W. Va. 1997) (per curiam) (noting that the trial court "found no evidence of self-defense and refused to give an instruction regarding self-defense" even though female defendant testified regarding a history of abuse from the deceased); State v. Smith, 481
S.E.2d 747, 751 (W. Va. 1996) (per curiam) (upholding the trial court's denial of a self-defense
instruction because, even though female defendant testified to episodes of abuse, including one
the morning before the shooting where the deceased struck defendant's head against the side of
her mobile home and threatened to kill her, "there was no evidence presented to establish that
appellant reasonably believed that she or any other person was in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury on the present occasion when the deadly force was used" against her sleeping live-in boyfriend) (emphasis added).
In an even more shocking example of a West Virginia trial court's refusal to give a selfdefense instruction, see State v. Headley, 558 S.E.2d 324, 327 (W. Va. 2001). Headley involved a
battered woman who killed her husband during a violent confrontation. Id. The defendant physically fought with her abuser, who threw the defendant on the ground, punched her face and head,
from which she received injuries, including a broken nose and severe bruising to her face, arms,
and feet. Id. She tried unsuccessfully to escape and managed her way into the kitchen and
grabbed a knife. Id. She told her abuser to stay away, but he said he wasn't afraid and then came
toward her and began pushing her. Id. She then stabbed him and tried to call the police. Id. Her
abuser then pulled the telephone out of the wall, hit her with it, and threw the phone across the
room. Id. Her abuser then collapsed from the knife wound. Id. The trial court ruled that the
defendant would not be allowed to introduce evidence in support of her self-defense theory. Id.
The record outlines the result of the trial court's decision as follows:
[The defendant] was not allowed to offer: (a) evidence of her prior history of
domestic violence with [her abuser], (b) testimony from a domestic violence
expert, and (c) jury instructions on the issue of self-defense. The State was
permitted to offer testimony that while holding the knife, [the defendant] had
threatened to kill [her abuser].
Id. The jury found her guilty of involuntary manslaughter and, in addition to her one-year jail
sentence, ordered her to pay $187,209.29 in restitution for her abuser's medical bills. Id. The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in reversing the trial court's decision and remanding the
case for an entry of a judgment of acquittal, went so far as to chastise the Wood County Circuit
Court for its failure to allow the defendant to properly pursue a defense of self-defense. Id. at
328-29. The Court further stated its concern as follows: "This omission is especially troubling in

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2008

41

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 8

1180

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 110

jury issue, given that threats from a sleeping husband do not create "reasonable
grounds" of "imminent danger of death or serious bodily jury,26 the defendant was excluded from presenting any evidence of (1) the deceased's character
or reputation as a dangerous person, (2) any prior attacks by the deceased on the
defendant, and (3) any prior threats or specific violent acts on any other persons, 257 including alleged acts of sexual misconduct against her two young
daughters, by the deceased.25 8
The defendant was, however, allowed to introduce limited evidence of
the BWS by an expert witness. The trial judge, with an obvious bias, stated that
he did not particularly like evidence of the BWS because he did not "really
think there [was] such a thing" as the BWS.25 9 However, because the West Virthis case because the jury specifically asked during its deliberations whether self-defense was an
issue." Id. at 328 n.3.
See Smith, 481 S.E.2d at 751 (upholding the trial court's denial of a self-defense instruction
256
because "there was no evidence presented to establish that appellant reasonably believed that she
or any other person was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury on the present occasion when the deadly force was used" against her sleeping live-in boyfriend) (emphasis added).
See also Rosen, supra note 15, at 50.
257 The corresponding law in West Virginia for the use of such evidence in self-defense cases is
stated as follows:
In a prosecution for murder, where self-defense is relied upon to excuse the
homicide, and there is evidence showing, or tending to show, that the deceased was at the time of the killing, making a murderous attack upon the defendant, it is competent for the defense to prove the character or reputation of
the deceased as a dangerous and quarrelsome man, and also to prove prior attacks made by the deceased upon him, as well as threats made to other parties
against him; and, if the defendant has knowledge of specific acts of violence
by the deceased against other parties, he should be allowed to give evidence
thereof.
Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Riley, 500 S.E.2d 524 (W. Va. 1997) (per curiam); Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Louk,
301 S.E.2d 596 (W. Va. 1983); Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Gwinn, 288 S.E.2d 533 (W. Va. 1982); Syl. Pt.
1, State v. Hardin, 112 S.E. 401 (W. Va. 1922) (emphasis added). The corresponding law in West
Virginia for the exclusion of such evidence where self-defense is not found to be present, as in this
hypothetical, is stated as follows:
When in a prosecution for murder the defendant relies upon self-defense to
excuse the homicide and the evidence does not show or tend to show that the
defendant was acting in self-defense when he shot and killed the deceased, the
defendant will not be permitted to prove that the deceased was of dangerous,
violent and quarrelsome character or reputation.
Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Riley, 500 S.E.2d 524 (W. Va. 1997) (per curiam); Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Collins,
180 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1971).
258
See Smith, 481 S.E.2d at 751 (noting that, in a case involving a woman who shot her sleeping live-in boyfriend while he slept, the trial court granted the state's motions in limine to exclude,
among other things, any references to alleged sexual abuse of the defendant's daughter by the
deceased).
259 See State v. Wyatt, 482 S.E.2d 147, 157 (W. Va. 1996) (noting that, during pretrial proceedings, the Raleigh County Circuit Court judge stated that he "did not 'really think there is such a
thing' as battered women's syndrome").
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ginia Supreme Court had previously held that such expert testimony on the
BWS is admissible "to explain the psychological basis for the battered woman's
syndrome and to offer an opinion that the defendant meets the requisite profile
of the syndrome, ' '26° the trial judge felt he had no other choice than to admit
such evidence. The trial judge ruled that because such evidence had to be admitted, it would only be used to determine the defendant's mental state. 261 During the trial, this evidence was presented to show why the defendant thought her
actions in killing her husband were reasonable, but it did nothing except hurt her
case under the objective standard of reasonableness requirement. How could
she be objective while tied, naked, tired, sore, and hungry in her own basement?
How could she think like an objectively reasonable person after being repeatedly raped and beaten by her abusive husband? How could she remain objectively reasonable while taking advantage of her one chance to free herself from
her captor and tend to her young daughters? Nevertheless, under the current law
of self-defense in West Virginia, though her actions may have been subjectively
reasonable,26 2 they were definitely not objectively reasonable.26 3 Thus, the defendant's attempt to defend her actions on grounds of self-defense failed and she
was convicted of murder.
On appeal, the court upheld the conviction because the trial court properly applied the current law in West Virginia on self-defense. This author has
no dispute that the hypothetical trial court properly applied West Virginia's current law on self-defense in the hypothetical situation. This author insists, however, that such law is highly discriminatory. West Virginia should not allow the
possibility for such a completely unfair and preposterous result. The abusers in
these cases do deserve protection under the law, but at what cost? West Virginia's current law on self-defense puts the rights of the individual abuser above
the personal safety and bodily integrity of those beaten at the abuser's hands.
This result cannot and should not stand. Such an unfair result would not occur
if West Virginia adopted an excuse-based Battered Women Defense. This defense, narrowly tailored to a reasonable battered woman, would properly confront the specific and delicate circumstances surrounding battered women's selfdefense cases, more adequately accommodate the purpose of the BWS testimony, and more adequately explain the rationale behind the battered woman's
Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Steele, 359 S.E.2d 558 (W. Va. 1987).
261 See State v. Dozier, 255 S.E.2d 552, 555 (W. Va. 1979) (indicating that evidence of the
Battered Women Syndrome could be admissible in self-defense cases to determine the defendant's
mental state).
262
The subjective reasonableness test in the defense of self-defense in West Virginia is found
in the language "a defendant who. .. actually does believe, that he is in imminent danger of death
or serious bodily harm .....
State v. W.J.B., 276 S.E.2d 550, 553 (W. Va. 1981) (emphasis
added).
263
The objective reasonableness test in the defense of self-defense in West Virginia is found in
the language "a defendant who ... has reasonablegrounds to believe.., that he is in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily harm .... I
Id. (emphasis added).
260
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actions. In addition, because any acquittal under the Battered Women Defense
would be categorized under a theory of excuse, the court's holding would ease
societal fears that the homicide was deemed proper or justified.
E.

State v. Norman Should Not Stand in West Virginia

As cited previously in this Note, the most compelling example of the
need for an excuse-based Battered Women Defense incorporating the "reasonable battered woman" standard is seen in the North Carolina decision State v.
Norman.264 Unfortunately, the strict application of perfect self-defense law in
that case, still the current law of North Carolina, 265 parallels the application of
self-defense law in West Virginia. 266 In reading the following appalling facts of
the Norman case, it is important to understand that if this or a similar case was
brought before a West Virginia court strictly applying current, traditional selfdefense law, the same tragic result would surely occur.26 7
264

State v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. App. 1988), overruled by State v. Norman, 378

S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
265 See Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 13 ("[O]ur law of self-defense ... require[s] that a defendant
claiming that a homicide was justified and, as a result, inherently lawful by reason of perfect selfdefense must establish that she reasonably believed at the time of the killing she otherwise would
have immediately suffered death or great bodily harm.").
Compare id.("[A] defendant claiming that a homicide was justified ...by reason of perfect
266
self-defense must establish that she reasonably believed at the time of the killing she otherwise
would have immediately suffered death or great bodily harm"), with State v. McClanahan, 454
S.E.2d 115, 118 (W. Va. 1994) ("[A]n apprehension of harm, to support a claim of self-defense,
must be an apprehension existing at the time of the defendant's attack on the victim."), and Syl.
Pt. 6, State v. McMillion, 138 S.E. 732 (W. Va. 1927) ("No apprehension of danger previously
entertained will justify the commission of the homicide; it must be an apprehension existing at the
time the defendant fired the fatal shot.").
267
Compare Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 13 ("The evidence in this case did not tend to show that
the defendant reasonably believed that she was confronted by a threat of imminent death or great
bodily harm. The evidence tended to show that no harm was 'imminent' or about to happen to the
defendant when she shot her husband. The uncontroverted evidence was that her husband had
been asleep for some time when she walked to her mother's house, returned with the pistol, fixed
the pistol after it jammed and then shot her husband three times in the back of the head. The
defendant was not faced with an instantaneous choice between killing her husband or being killed
or seriously injured. Instead, all of the evidence tended to show that the defendant had ample time
and opportunity to resort to other means of preventing further abuse by her husband."), with State
v. Riley, 500 S.E.2d 524, 528 n.2 (W. Va. 1997) (per curiam) (noting that the trial court "found no
evidence of self-defense and refused to give an instruction regarding self-defense" even though
female defendant testified regarding a history of abuse from the deceased), and State v. Smith,
481 S.E.2d 747, 751 (W. Va. 1996) (per curiam) (upholding the trial court's denial of a selfdefense instruction because, even though female defendant testified to episodes of abuse, including one the morning before the shooting where the deceased struck defendant's head against the
side of her mobile home and threatened to kill her, "there was no evidence presented to establish
that appellant reasonably believed that she or any other person was in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury on the present occasion when the deadly force was used" against her sleeping live-in boyfriend) (emphasis added).
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The defendant in Norman, a battered woman, was subjected to a barrage
of physical, verbal, and psychological abuse from her alcoholic, abusive husband for twenty years. 68 A few years into the marriage, when the defendant
was pregnant with the couple's youngest child, her husband beat her and kicked
her down a flight of stairs. 269 The following day, as a result of this violence, the
baby was born prematurely.2 70 The husband did not work; instead, in order to
gain an income for himself, he forced his wife to prostitute herself.271 If she did
not make a minimum of one hundred dollars each day from her forced prostitution or if she pleaded to her husband to stop making her perform those acts, then
he would beat her.272 This practice occurred every day for years and lasted until
her husband's death.273 The Court of Appeals of North Carolina described part
of the abuse as follows:
[Her husband] commonly called defendant "Dogs," "Bitches,"
and "Whores," and referred to her as a dog. [Her husband] beat
defendant "most every day," especially when he was drunk and
when other people were around, to "show off." He would beat
defendant with whatever was handy-his fist, a fly swatter, a
baseball bat, his shoe, or a bottle; he put out cigarettes on defendant's skin; he threw food and drink in her face and refused
to let her eat for days at a time; and he threw glasses, ashtrays,
and beer bottles at her and once smashed a glass in her face.
Defendant exhibited to the jury scars on her face from these incidents. [Her husband] would often make defendant bark like a
dog, and if she refused, he would beat her. He often forced defendant to sleep on the concrete floor of their home and on several occasions forced her to eat dog or cat food out of the dog or
cat bowl.274
The defendant's husband threatened to cut her heart out, told her in front of another person that he would "cut her breast off and shove it up her rear end," and
often said to both her and others that he would kill her.275
A day and a half before the shooting, the defendant's husband again
forced her to prostitute herself at a truck stop to make money. 6 Her husband
268

State v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. App. 1988), overruled by State v. Norman, 378

S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
269

Id.

270

Id.

271

273

Id.
Id.
Id.

274

Id.

275

Id. at 587-88.

272
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later, while drunk, went to the truck stop, beat his wife there, slammed the car
door into her, and threw hot coffee on her.277 He was arrested on the return
home for DUI and, when released from jail the next day, he again beat, slapped,
and threw glasses, ashtrays, and beer bottles at his wife, and later smeared a
sandwich in her face that she had made for him.27 8 That evening, a police officer came to their house because of a report received about a domestic dispute at
the home.279 The responding officer testified that "defendant was bruised and
crying and that she stated her husband had been beating her all day and she
could not take it any longer. ''280 When told by the officer that she should file a
warrant against her husband, she said that she could not because her husband
would kill her.28 1 The officer returned to the home shortly after this conversation because of another report received. 282 The events occurring from this second report were stated as follows:
[Diefendant had taken an overdose of "nerve pills," and... [her
husband] was interfering with emergency personnel who were
trying to treat defendant. [Her husband] was drunk and was
making statements such as, "If you want to die, you deserve to
die. I'll give you more pills," and "Let the bitch die .... She
ain't nothing but a dog. She don't deserve to live." [Her husband] also threatened to kill defendant, defendant's mother, and
defendant's grandmother. The law enforcement officer reached
for his flashlight or blackjack and chased [her husband] into the
house. Defendant was taken to [the hospital].2 83
On the day of her husband's death, he was more violent and angry than
usual.284 He beat the defendant all day, slapped her, poured a beer on her head,
276

Id. at 587.

277

Id. at 587-88.

278

Id. The appalling incident involving the sandwich was stated in the court record as follows:
[Her husband] asked defendant to make him a sandwich; when defendant
brought it to him, he threw it on the floor and told her to make him another.
Defendant made him a second sandwich and brought it to him; [her husband]
again threw it on the floor, telling her to put something on her hands because
he did not want her to touch the bread. Defendant made a third sandwich using a paper towel to handle the bread. [Her husband] took the third sandwich
and smeared it in defendant's face.

Id. at 588.
279

Id.

280

Id., overruledby State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).

281

Id.

282

Id.

283

id.
Id.

284
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kicked her in the side of the head while she was driving, threatened to cut her
throat, threatened to kill her, threatened to cut off her breast, smashed food in
her face, and put out a cigarette on her chest. 285 Later that day when her husband went to the bedroom to take a nap, the defendant went in also and tried to
lie down on one of the beds in the room.28 6 Her husband told her, "No bitch...
Dogs don't sleep on beds, they sleep in [sic] the floor., 287 Then, one of the defendant's daughters asked her if she could watch her baby.2 88 She did so but,
when the child began to cry, she took it to her mother's house out of fear that
the crying would bother her husband.28 9 While at her mother's house, she found
a pistol.290 She then proceeded with the pistol to her own home, where she shot
her sleeping husband.29'
At the defendant's trial for the murder of her husband, the court refused
to instruct the jury on self-defense.2 92 The defendant was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter.2 93 The Court of Appeals of North Carolina reversed the trial
court's decision and remanded the case, stating that, because the evidence was
sufficient to send the self-defense question to the jury, the defendant was entitled to a self-defense instruction.2 94 The court of appeals attempted to justify its
conclusion by merging the facts of the case into the strict mold of traditional
self-defense. In so doing, however, the court relied exclusively on the defendant's own perceptions and the theoretical mental state of a spouse suffering
from Battered Spouse Syndrome to overcome the subjective and objective reasonableness requirements and the imminence requirement of self-defense. 295 As
285

Id.

286

Id.

287

Id.

288

Id.

Id.
Id.
291 Id.
292
State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 16 (N.C. 1989).
289

290

293

Id.

294

State v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586, 592 (N.C. App. 1988), overruled by State v. Norman, 378

S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
295 Id. at 591. Defendant's testimony pertaining to the reasonableness of her actions was stated
as follows:
Defendant testified that things at home were so bad she could no longer stand
it. She explained that she could not leave [her husband] because he would kill
her. She stated that she had left him before on several occasions and that each
time he found her, took her home, and beat her. She said that she was afraid
to take out a warrant on her husband because he had said that if she ever had
him locked up, he would kill her when he got out. She stated she did not have
him committed because he told her he would see the authorities coming for
him and before they got to him he would cut defendant's throat. Defendant
also testified that when he threatened to kill her, she believed he would kill
her if he had the chance.
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one commentator noted, the use of such evidence by the court of appeals to satisfy the objective reasonableness and imminence requirements amounted to the
employment of a "reasonable battered woman" standard.296 That standard,
however, did not fit into the traditional objective standard used by North Carolina and was thus improper. The court erred when it attempted to fit the reasonable battered woman standard into a justification-based, traditional, maleoriented version of self-defense. Even though the idea behind such a move is
noteworthy, it is not a proper application of the law. To be a proper application
of the law, the court must adopt a new form of self-defense, a Battered Women
Defense, and then apply the reasonable battered woman standard to that defense.
Unfortunately, however, because of the court of appeals incorrectly applied
North Carolina's self-defense law, its decision was overturned and the defendant's conviction was reinstated by the Supreme Court of North Carolina.2 97
The Supreme Court of North Carolina's decision, though resulting from
a proper application of North Carolina's self-defense law, should be an obvious
and glaring example to every state utilizing a similar self-defense law, including
West Virginia, 298 that the application of such a traditional, male-oriented selfId.
296
297

See Shad, supra note 30, at 1169.
State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 16 (N.C. 1989). The Supreme Court of North Carolina

chastised the court of appeals' incorrect application of North Carolina's self-defense law and
voiced continued approval of the outdated law as follows:
The reasoning of our Court of Appeals in this case proposes to change
the established law of self-defense by giving the term "imminent" a meaning
substantially more indefinite and all-encompassing than its present meaning.
This would result in a substantial relaxation of the requirement of real or apparent necessity to justify homicide. Such reasoning proposes justifying the
taking of human life not upon the reasonable belief it is necessary to prevent
death or great bodily harm-which the imminence requirement ensures-but
upon purely subjective speculation that the decedent probably would present a
threat to life at a future time and that the defendant would not be able to avoid
the predicted threat.
[W]e decline to expand our law of self-defense beyond the limits of
immediacy and necessity which have heretofore provided an appropriately
narrow but firm basis upon which homicide may be justified and, thus, lawful
by reason of perfect self-defense ....
Id. at 15-16.
Fortunately for the defendant in Norman, however, though the harsh, punitive judicial
system did not offer her sympathy, the executive department did come to her aid. "On
July 7, 1989, three months after the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision reinstated
Mrs. Norman's conviction, North Carolina Governor James G. Martin commuted her
sentence and ordered her release from prison .... Mrs. Norman had served two months
in prison." See Shad, supra note 30, at n.24 (citing Ruffin, Battered Wife Released
From Prison,THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), July 8, 1989, at Al, col. 1).
298 It is important to note here an important distinction between North Carolina's and West
Virginia's self-defense laws. North Carolina employs two forms of self-defense-perfect self-
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defense law to cases involving battered women is unacceptable, unfair, discriminatory, and should not remain current law in those cases. One commentator discussed the resulting decision in State v. Norman and the obvious need for
changes in North Carolina's self-defense law as follows:
There is no question that the North Carolina Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Norman is a correct application of the existing law. That this is true illustrates how inadequately traditional rules of law are equipped to resolve the problem of domestic violence, and exemplifies the need for changes in the
law that will recognize the impact of battered woman syndrome
on its victims and ensure more equitable treatment of cases involving battered women.2
The decision of the Court of Appeals of North Carolina, though later overruled
by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, made the following important observations into the plight of battered women and the need for an accommodation of
battered women in self-defense cases:
Mindful that the law should never casually permit an otherwise
unlawful killing of another human being to be justified or excused, this Court is of the opinion that with the battered spouse
there can be, under certain circumstances, an unlawful killing of
a passive victim that does not preclude the defense of perfect
self-defense. Given the characteristics of battered spouse syndrome, we do not believe that a battered person must wait until
a deadly attack occurs or that the victim must in all cases be actually attacking or threatening to attack at the very moment defendant commits the unlawful act for the battered person to act
defense and imperfect self-defense. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 9 (N.C. 1989). Imperfect
self-defense is defined in North Carolina as follows:
[I]f defendant believed it was necessary to kill the deceased in order to save
herself from death or great bodily harm, and if defendant's belief was reasonable in that the circumstances as they appeared to her at the time were sufficient to create such a belief in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness, but
defendant, although without murderous intent, was the aggressor in bringing
on the difficulty, or defendant used excessive force, the defendant under those
circumstances has only the imperfect right of self-defense, having lost the
benefit of perfect self-defense, and is guilty at least of voluntary manslaughter.
State v. Wilson, 285 S.E.2d 804, 808 (N.C. 1982) (quoting State v. Norris, 279 S.E.2d 570, 573
(N.C. 1981)). West Virginia does not recognize imperfect self-defense. Because West Virginia's
sole version of self-defense is very similar to North Carolina's version of perfect self-defense, this
author will limit the discussion of North Carolina's law to its version of perfect self-defense and
not imperfect self-defense.
299
Shad, supra note 30, at 1177.
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in self-defense. Such a standard, in our view, would ignore the
realities of the condition.
Likewise, West Virginia should no longer "ignore the realities of the
condition" of battered women. 30 1 A judicial outcome such as State v. Norman
should never have occurred, but was inevitable under North Carolina's strict law
of self-defense. Unfortunately, a similar result is certain to occur under West
Virginia's current, traditional self-defense law unless immediate change is
made. The need for the adoption of an excuse-based Battered Women Defense
in West Virginia is thus evident and long overdue.
V. CONCLUSION

Domestic violence is a serious problem in West Virginia and the United
States in general, especially against women. Many women suffer abuse as part
of their daily lives. On occasion, however, a battered woman strikes back
against her abusive partner. A few of these cases result in the death of the
abuser at the hands of the abused, usually occurring during a lull in the violence.
This lull may be the only available opportunity that the battered woman has in
defending herself from further abuse, serious injury, or death when the lull inevitably ends. When the battered woman does act, however, she faces a harsh,
punitive judicial system that is unresponsive to the plight of battered women. If
she is to gain acquittal for her reasonable actions, she must utilize a discriminatory, unmodified, traditional, male-oriented version of self-defense. She may
also use expert testimony on the BWS to show the subjective reasonableness of
her actions. However, because self-defense in West Virginia also requires an
objective standard of reasonableness and because a woman subjected to years of
verbal, physical, and psychological abuse no longer reacts to her environment as
an objective reasonable person, her self-defense claim must fail.
West Virginia should no longer accept such a harsh, unfair, static result.
West Virginia should not force a battered woman who protects herself against
her abuser to seek acquittal through a traditional, male-oriented version of selfdefense. As the above examination of West Virginia's self-defense cases involving battered women makes clear,30 2 application of West Virginia's current
self-defense laws inevitably fail the battered women defendants, no matter how
compelling the circumstances.
300 State v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586, 592 (N.C. App. 1988), overruled by State v. Norman, 378
S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989). The court further justified its position by stating that, based on the evidence
of abuse before the court, a jury "could find that decedent's sleep was but a momentary hiatus in a
continuous reign of terror by the decedent, that defendant merely took advantage of her first opportunity to protect herself, and that defendant's act was not without the provocation required for
perfect self-defense." Id.
301 Id.
302

See discussion supra Part III.B.
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West Virginia should, therefore, adopt an excuse-based version of selfdefense, entitled, "Battered Women Defense." Battered Women Defense would
be a narrowly tailored version of the traditional law of self-defense, except that
it would contain a "reasonable battered woman" standard instead of the traditional objective reasonableness standard. This "reasonable battered woman"
standard would lower the objectivity standard to that of a reasonable woman
suffering from the BWS, while not relying entirely upon that particular
woman's subjective perceptions to gain an acquittal. Evidence of a history of
abuse and expert testimony on the BWS would be introduced to prove whether
the defendant's conduct satisfied both the subjective reasonableness and reasonable battered woman standards. Altering the traditional justification-based law
of self-defense to an excuse-based Battered Women Defense would remove
societal fears that such conduct would be accepted or encouraged by the courts.
The new, narrowly tailored law would not justify the defendant's conduct as
valid. Instead, it would give the court a useful, nondiscriminatory self-defense
standard to use in performing a case-by-case evaluation of whether the battered
woman defendant's conduct was, under the specific circumstances of the particular case, understandable and, thus, excused from punishment.
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